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NO DOGS ALLOWED: HAWAII'S
QUARANTINE LAW VIOLATES THE RIGHTS
OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES
Sande Buhai Pond*
I. INTRODUCTION
Stephanie is a visually-impaired Hawaii resident who has used
a guide dog (seeing-eye dog) for several years. Her accounting firm
temporarily transferred Stephanie, a CPA with expertise in mergers
and acquisitions, to New York to assist a client in a multi-million
dollar transaction, placing her in an impossible position: If she takes
her guide dog to New York, she will have to put it in quarantine
when she returns; if she goes to New York without her guide dog, she
must rely on others for aid in maneuvering through the unfamiliar
surroundings. Either way, Stephanie will be unable to function in her
usual independent manner.
Vernon, a visually-impaired resident of California, also uses a
guide dog. Vernon's friend has offered him a free apartment in Maui
for two months. Unfortunately, Vernon cannot travel to Hawaii
unless he either leaves his dog in California, where it will lose its
training, or brings it with him where it will stay in mandatory quaran-
tine on the island of Oahu for the entire duration of his stay. Both
options eliminate his ability to travel safely and affect his indepen-
dence.
* Faculty Pro Bono Director and Clinical Professor, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles, California. I would like to thank Professors Jan Costello, Christopher May, and
Katherine Tate for their input. I am also very grateful, and would like to thank Karen
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Review for their hard work.
146 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:145
Federal law has recognized that persons with disabilities' are
entitled to protection against discrimination. Both the Rehabilitation
Act of 19732 and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)3 prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities. The
ADA aims to assist persons with disabilities in leading fuller, more
productive lives, enabling society to fully benefit from the skills and
talents of such persons.4
The recent passage of the ADA has outlawed many barriers for
persons with disabilities, but many still remain. Several existing laws
adversely impact persons with disabilities, although they are not
openly discriminatory.5 This Article discusses one such barrier:
Hawaii's eighty-year-old quarantine law-requiring a 120-day quar-
antine of dogs and cats upon entering Hawaii-to prevent the spread
of rabies. Attempts to modify this absolute rule have thus far been
unsuccessful.6
1. This Article will generally use the preferred term "person" or "people With
disabilities." However, some older cases and statutes may use the term "handicapped
person" and, when quoting, those terms may be used. The definition of these terms is
substantially similar.
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988).
4. Dick Thornburgh, Introduction to OFFICE ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WiTH DISABILTIES ACT. QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS (1991).
5. For example, some statutes limit the number of persons who may reside in a
residence. See, e.g., City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 115 S. Ct. 1776 (1995) (city zoning
ordinance limiting the number of unrelated persons who could live in a single-family
dwelling). Laws of this kind could discriminate against persons with disabilities who need
an"attendant living with them.
6. In Crowder v. Kitagawa, No. 94-15403 (9th Cir. filed June 13, 1995) (hereinafter
Crowder I], a class action suit currently pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Appellant Crowder challenges Hawaii's insistence on quarantining guide dogs. Appellant's
Opening Brief at 2, Crowder 11 (No. 94-15403). He represents the class of mainland
United States visually-impaired users of guide dogs, and Appellant Good represents the
class of Hawaii visually-impaired users of guide dogs. Id. Although the Hawaii District
Court in Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Haw. 1994) [hereinafter Crowder 1]
granted summary judgment for the State of Hawaii, it stated
[w]ell, one way or the other it should be because this.., is an important issue
and it should be visited not just by me, but I think it should be visited.., by the
Court of Appeals one way or the other ... I don't often invite people to appeal
my decisions, but they appeal them anyway, and in this case, I think it's
appropriate for there to be an appeal regardless of how I rule because I think
there should be a review of this whole question by the Ninth Circuit.
Transcript of Proceedings at 5-6, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE) [hereinafter Transcript].
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This Article will describe Hawaii's current quarantine law and
its impact on persons with disabilities.7 Next, it will consider the law
in relation to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.' Finally, this
Article will evaluate the constitutionality of Hawaii's quarantine law.'
Based on this analysis, the Article will urge an exemption to Hawaii's
current quarantine law for individuals with disabilities.
II. HAWAII'S QUARANTINE LAW
Hawaii is the only state without any incidents of rabies."0 To
protect this status, Hawaii implemented a program in 1920 that
includes a 120-day quarantine for animals, including dogs, entering the
state from the continental United States and other areas that lack a
rabies-free classification.
At the time of enactment, quarantine was the only viable
alternative to combat the spread of rabies occurring in the western
United States." Although evidence at that time demonstrated that
rabies could still develop after a 120-day period, legislators based the
law on available data showing that eighty percent of animals
contracting rabies displayed signs of the disease within four months.1 2
The quarantine law has remained unchanged 3 despite the develop-
ment of vaccines sufficiently capable of preventing both rabies and its
spread.4
Hawaii's continued use of the quarantine system is based in part
upon findings of the World Health Organization (WHO) which, since
1950, has recommended that "in order to maintain a rabies free
environment, an imported animal should be vaccinated with an
inactivated (killed) virus vaccine, entered into a 120-day quarantine,
7. This Article concentrates on the visually impaired who use guide dogs as a means
of assuring safe mobility. However, there are service dogs, which assist persons who use
wheelchairs, and other individuals with disabilities by performing certain essential daily
living activities. There are also signal dogs, which are trained to alert hearing-impaired
persons to sounds such as the ringing of a doorbell or telephone. For individuals using
these latter two types of dogs, the Hawaii quarantine law is equally discriminatory.
8. See infra part VII.
9. See infra part VIII.
10. INTERIM TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE STATE OF HAWAII'S ANIMAL QUARANTINE
SYSTEM, REPORT TO THE 1990 STATE LEGISLATURE 9 (1990) [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
11. Id at 8.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1. The Task Force noted that "the existing quarantine system hats]
remained intact for over 77 years." Id.
14.. Id. at 21.
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and placed on a 60-day home quarantine and leashing requirement.""
However, Hawaii does not require the vaccination of pets before
importation, nor does the state require Animal Quarantine Station
caretakers, who come into frequent contact with the quarantined
animals, to receive routine vaccinations. 6 Hawaii's adherence to
selected-and outdated-portions of the WHO's recommendations is
biased and irrational.
A. Statutory Authority for the Quarantine Law
Enforcement of the quarantine law rests with the Hawaii
Department of Agriculture (Department),17 which regulates the
inspection, quarantine, disinfection, and destruction of animals in
Hawaii. 8 This power enables the Department to work toward the
eradication of "contagious, infectious, and communicable diseases
among animals."' 9
Other provisions limit this apparent broad authorization.
Section 142-4 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes requires an inspection
of all animals upon entry into the state. In addition, there cannot be
a delay "concerning the landing of any domestic animal for which a
certificate of health has been issued as prescribed by the Federal
Cattle Contagious Disease Act."2  These statutory limitations
indicate that the state legislature's original intent was to quarantine
only those animals posing a health threat, rather than burden the
importation of animals demonstrably free from disease.21  The
15. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 9.
17. Control over the quarantine law is granted to the Hawaii Department of
Agriculture (DOA) by the Hawaii State Legislature. HAW. REV. STAT. § 142-2 (1985 &
Supp. 1992). The DOA rules regarding quarantine, in pertinent part, state that "the
objective... is to prevent the introduction of rabies into the State through a one hundred
twenty-day quarantine." HAW. ADMIN. RULES § 4-18-1 (1981) [hereinafter DOA RULES].
18. "Subject to chapter 91 the department of agriculture may make and amend rules
for the inspection, quarantine, disinfection, or destruction, either upon introduction into
the State or at any time or place within the State, of animals and the premises and effects
used in connection with the animals." HAW. REV. STAT. § 142-2 (Supp. 1992).
19. HAW. REV. STAT. § 142-3 (1985).
20. HAW. REV. STAT. § 142-4 (Supp. 1992).
21. Another attack on the legislation is that it exceeds the scope of the statute. "The
[Dlepartment [of Agriculture] may... prohibit the importation... of animals known to
be or suspected of being infected with a contagious, infectious, or communicable disease
or known to have been exposed to any such disease." I&. § 142-2. The DOA, however,
is exercising this authority without any knowledge about the health of the dog quarantined.
DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-7 (1987).
NO DOGS ALLOWED
Department's administrative rules regarding the quarantine ignore
both of these limitations z
B. The General Quarantine Rule
Despite the legislature's original intent, the general rule, as
enforced by the administrative rules, requires a 120-day quarantine of
all dogs, cats, and other carnivores upon arrival in the state.z This
rule does not, on its face, discriminate against persons with disabili-
ties, as there is no differentiation among animals based on breed, size,
age, or traits, nor among particular owners. The rules expressly cover
guide dogs, and the only accommodation made to persons with
disabilities is the option to occupy housing at the quarantine station
with their guide dog to maintain an exercise regimen for that dog.24
This section of the regulation also requires that a sighted person
accompany every visually-impaired person during these exercise
regimens.25
The rules provide that housing at the quarantine station shall be
provided to visually-impaired guide dog owners during the quarantine
period, providing a request for reservation has been made in
advance.26 Since 1991, only one visually-impaired person has utilized
the quarantine housing,27 demonstrating the inadequacy of the
accommodation. More importantly, the quarantine station chairper-
22. Section 4-18-3 of the DOA's Administrative Rules governs the quarantine of dogs,
cats, and other carnivores. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-3 (1981). Section 4-18-14
establishes fees for food, housing, care, and "registration." DOA RULES, supra note 17,
§ 4-18-4 (1982). Sections 4-18-7 and 4-18-8 create the only exemption to the 120-day
quarantine requirement. DOA RULES, supra note 17, §§ 4-18-7, 4-18-8 (1987). The
presence of a United States Department of Agriculture Certificate of Health is not among
the exemptions listed.
23. Section 4-18-7 states that
[d]ogs, cats, and other carnivores originating from the United States mainland
and all other countries not included on the list of areas designated by the board
as rabies-free and entitled to an exemption from the one-hundred-twenty-day
quarantine requirement ... upon arrival and before entry, shall be confined in
the animal quarantine station ... for a period of one hundred twenty days or
longer ... to prevent the introduction of rabies.
DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-7 (1987).
24. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-12 (1981). The residency provisions for guide
dog owners are provided in section 4-18-12(a). Section 4-18-12 requires advance notice
by persons with disabilities, and gives the quarantine station chairperson discretion in
approving requests for this housing.
25. Id. § 4-18-12(f).
26. Id.
27. Telephone Interview with Dr. Sturgess, Station Manager, Hawaii Quarantine (July
31, 1995).
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son has discretion in approving requests for housing. Thus, the
"housing provision" is not an absolute guarantee, and there is
potential for visually-impaired persons to be forced to find and pay
for accommodation without the assistance of their guide dogs.
This provision makes no allowance for guide dogs to leave the
quarantine premises other than for veterinary treatment, even if the
dogs are accompanied by a state agent." In contrast, circus animals
and police dogs are permitted to leave the quarantine area when
accompanied by a Department agent or authorized handler.29 The
rules patently suggest that circus animals and police dogs are more
worthy of an exception than a trained guide dog. Further, the rules
assume that a state agent or military handler can more adeptly control
a trained dog than a person with a disability, which perpetuates bias
and depicts how administration of Hawaii's quarantine exemptions
discriminate against persons with disabilities.
C. Special Exemptions to the Rule
The administrative rules include other exemptions to the
quarantine, although no exemptions for guide dogs exist. First,
animals with a health certificate indicating a current vaccination may
enter only from rabies-free areas.3" However, the continental United
States is not designated as one of the few "rabies-free" regions.
Moreover, certain animals enjoy a limited exemption in that they can
leave the quarantine station during their quarantine period. Specifi-
cally, the rules allow circus animals to leave in the company of a
Department agent if the animal returns after each performance and
has no contact with unquarantined animals.3 Under government
surveillance, circus animals can also travel to other Hawaiian islands.
The rules allow this exception despite well-documented incidents of
rabies in common circus menageries, which include trained dogs, lions,
tigers, monkeys, and camels.32 Celebrities' animals also have
received exemption from the quarantine requirements.33 Further,
28. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-10 (1981).
29. Id. § 4-18-10(b)(2).
30. DOA RULES,supra note 17, §§ 4-18-7,4-18-8 (1987). These sections create limited
exemptions to the 120-day quarantine for animals imported from areas designated as rabies
free.
31. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-10(b)(1) (1981).
32. GEORGE M. BAER, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RABIES 20 (2d ed. 1991).
33. The Hawaii Board of Agriculture unanimously approved the importation of two
Bactrian camels owned by Doris Duke, a renowned tobacco heiress, and waived the
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police and military-trained dogs can leave the quarantine area in the
company of authorized handlers-either state agents or military
handlers-for predetermined periods of training.'
Clearly the rules treat guide dogs differently than the above-
exempted animals. The rules assume, both explicitly and implicitly,
that persons with disabilities are less able to control their animals than
handlers of other types of animals. Presumably, state agents are able
to oversee numerous circus animals for an entire circus performance,
and police handlers are able to control trained dogs-both while
protecting the public against the chance of exposure to rabies. The
assumption that a state circus agent or police handler is better able to
control a trained dog than a person with a disability bespeaks an
inherent bias in the law and illustrates the discriminatory nature of
the law.
III. RABIES STATISTICS
Rabies does not pose a major health problem in the United
States. 5 It is a viral infection of the central nervous system that
primarily affects domesticated and wild, warm-blooded animals.36
The bite of a rabid animal transmits the disease to humans by
allowing the infected saliva to enter the person's nervous system.37
The incubation period in humans is usually between, three weeks and
three months, but in some cases, it can exceed one year; in unusual
cases, it can even exceed four years. 3 When properly administered
post exposure, the Human Diploid Cell Rabies Vaccine
(HDCRV)-the only post-exposure vaccine currently licensed in the
United States-has proven 100% effective against the development
of rabies.39 HDCRV requires only a series of five vaccinations in the
arm or leg, provided the vaccinations are administered close to the
time of infection.'
quarantine requirement. CH TRIB., Dec. 22, 1988, at 24.
34. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-10(b)(2).
35. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 6.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 4-5.
38. Human Rabies: Strain Identification Reveals Lengthy Incubation, 337 LANCET 822,
823 (1991).
39. Declaration of Charla Jones, D.V.M. at 6, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE).
40. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 7.
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With the exception of Australia and Antarctica, all continents
have reported cases of rabies in humans. 41  Sixty countries are
currently considered rabies-free, including Great Britain, Ireland,
Sweden, Norway, and Japan.42 In countries such as the United
States, where rabies in domestic animals is well-controlled, incidents
of rabies result most likely from wild animal bites or visits to
underdeveloped countries.43
In addition to the vaccine, the Rabid Fluorescent Focus
Inhibition Test (RFFIT) indicates protection against rabies infection
and provides a strong signal that a dog is not infected with, nor
incubating, rabies.' Together, the vaccine and RFFIT effectively
prevent and detect rabies.
45
The decline in the incidence of rabies in humans has been
"dramatic" since 1912,4 with an average of two cases per year
reported in the United States since 1960.' 7 Moreover, there have
been no indigenous dog exposure cases of rabies in the United States
since at least 1965.48
Further, the quarantine system has failed to intercept even a
single case of rabies in seventy-seven years.49 Thus, the quarantine
system has yet to be tested.5" In addition, because rabies can have
an incubation time in excess of 120 days, it is estimated that a 120-day
quarantine is only eighty percent effective.51 The substantially
improved methods of rabies control that have been developed in the
past eighty years would better protect public health than Hawaii's
41. Id at 6.
42. THE CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY OF HUMAN DISEASE 962 (Kenneth F. Kiple
ed., 1993).
43. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 6.
44. Declaration of Keith Clark, Director, Zoonosis Control Division, Bureau of
Veterinary Public Health, Austin, Texas (Feb. 21, 1992).
45. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 6.
46. Id. If one disregards foreign exposures, the decline is even more impressive. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id.
51. Id. Of the few countries that still rely on a quarantine system, most require that
incoming animals be vaccinated, and be quarantined for a longer period than 120 days, the
minimum recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO). Id. Hawaii, in
contrast, does not require incoming animals to be vaccinated, even though the WHO has
recommended this approach since 1950. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO EXPERT
COMMITTEE ON RABIES 43 (8th Report).
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current quarantine system. 2 Clearly, the current quarantine law is
outdated and ineffective.
IV. HAWAII'S SPECIAL TASK FORCE
In 1990 the Hawaii legislature appointed a special Task Force
comprised of legislators, veterinarians, representatives of persons with
disabilities, and health experts (hereinafter Task Force) to study and
report on the Hawaii quarantine system.53  Recognizing that the
overriding state policy should be the prevention of rabies in Hawaii,
the Task Force proposed only extremely limited exemptions. 4 In its
report, the Task Force devotes considerable attention to the problems
faced by persons in the disabled community who use guide dogs.5
Its findings promote Hawaii's state interest without the present
discriminatory impact on travelers with disabilities 6
The Task Force found that since 1965 there have been no
identified rabies cases in humans involving indigenous dog exposure
in the United States;57 the quarantine system has not discovered a
single rabid dog in seventy-seven years of operation. Their study
further recommended a special tatoo or microchip implant to alleviate
difficulties with guide dog identification and certification of health. 9
Finally, the risk of guide dogs carrying rabies was found to be low.'
The Task Force recommended exempting guide dogs from quarantine,
using the following guidelines: (1) a vaccine administered before
arriving in Hawaii; (2) a valid USDA health certificate; (3) a RFFIT
protective test result; (4) documentation of the individual's disability;
52. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 27.
53. Id. at 1. Co-chairpersons of the Task Force were the Chairpersons of the Senate
and House Committees on Agriculture. Id Also included on the Task Force were the
Chairperson of the Senate and House Committees on Health, and representatives of the
Department of Agriculture, Department of Health, disability policy groups, veterinarians,
the U.S. military, the Hawaii Humane Society, dog and cat fanciers, and the Hawaiian
community-at-large. IL Expert advice was provided by Dr. Michael Burridge, an expert
from the University of Florida on infectious diseases in the Caribbean Islands, who has
research experience in rabies prevention; and Dr. George Beran of Iowa State University,
a member of the WHO's Expert Committee on Rabies. Id.
54. Id. at 15-18. See also supra part II.C for further discussion on exemptions.
55. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 2.
56. Id. at 16-17.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 16-17.
60. Id. at 15.
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(5) a microchip implant to aid in identifying the dog;6" and (6) the
guide dog's successful completion of training.62
The recommended exemption would not apply if the dog had
been absent from Hawaii for more than 120 days after vaccination.63
However, the Task Force also suggested that absent an exemption
approval, a guide dog would be granted work-permit status and
allowed to leave the quarantine premises between the hours of 8:00
A.M. and 5:00 P.M. and return to quarantine daily.'
The Task Force supported its recommendations with information
regarding the dramatic improvement in rabies vaccines over the past
two decades, the use of vaccines as the primary mechanism for rabies
prevention in animals and humans, and the WHO's recommendation
of rabies vaccinations for animals transported between countries.
65
In addition, comparisons between countries with a six-month
quarantine program6 and ones with a vaccination program "indi-
cate[d] no significant differences between the number of rabid dogs
imported into the countries without quarantine requirements and the
number of cases which occurred following a quarantine period."'67
The Task Force implicitly recognized the limited value of the
120-day quarantine when it recommended that an animal coming from
a country other than the United States, or other specific rabies-free
countries, be subject to a six-month quarantine.' Additionally, ani-
mals from certain east African countries, known to have rabies strains
resistant to vaccines, are to be completely prohibited from importa-
tion.
69
Hawaii's major concern is the protection of its citizens from
rabies. The Task Force reinforced this goal while recommending an
exemption that would not increase the risk of rabies. The Task Force
found that the proposed quarantine exemption would accommodate
both goals by severely limiting the type of animals that can enter
61. The Task Force found that the inability to identify a specific dog or verify its
vaccination history created an obstacle for quarantine officials. IdL However, these
hindrances can easily be eliminated by requiring that the dog have a special tattoo or
implanted microchip. a at 16-17.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id. at 17.
64. d at 18.
65. Id. at 21.
66. For example, Great Britain has such a program. Id at 22.
67. Id.
68. Id at 25.
69. Id at 25-26.
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without a quarantine, and requiring stringent reporting and testing for
exempted animals.
Subsequent to the Task Force report, Hawaiian legislators
introduced several bills attempting to implement the recommenda-
tions.7" The legislature did not enact any of the bills, leaving the
current quarantine restrictions in place to apply to all guide dogs
entering Hawaii.
V. GUIDE DOG STATISTICS
The Task Force discovered that guide dogs face a particularly
low risk of rabies,71 primarily because they undergo long periods of
training and confinement, they are strictly controlled, either by leash
or confinement indoors, they have received proper vaccinations for
extended periods of time, they have no history of rabies exposure,
and they are of such a value that they require greater control and
medical care than other pets. Graduates of Guide Dogs of
America (GDA) must have a veterinary examination at least every six
months, with a health report forwarded to GDA after each visit so
that GDA may monitor any potential problems.73 Because guide
dog users comprise an extremely limited population and, consequent-
ly, pose virtually no potential for injury, the effect of a guide dog
exemption would be de minimis.7'
70. For example, Senate Bill 1171 created an exemption for Hawaii residents returning
to the state as long as certain requirements were met. 1991 Haw. Sess. Laws 1171. These
included vaccination within 30 days of departure, microchip implantation for identification
of the dog, rabies test before departure and upon return, proof of the handler's disability
and training of both the handler and dog, and absence from the state for no more than 30
days. Id. at 2-3. No provision was made for exemption of nonresident dogs entering
Hawaii. Id. The bill specifically recognized the minimal threat of rabies by assistance
dogs, and that the exemptions would not undermine the quarantine law for other animals.
Id. at 3. Senate Bill 2479, like Senate Bill 1171, recognized that assistance dogs provide
a limited threat of rabies. 1990 Haw. Sess. Laws 2479. However, it also provided an
exemption for Hawaii residents and, also provided that dogs trained in the United States,
if they traveled to Hawaii immediately at the completion of training would be exempted.
Id. at 3-4.
House Bill 2642 also attempted to implement the Task Force recommendations.
1990 Haw. Sess. Laws 2642. It established several categories of animals to be quarantined,
based on the point of origin, and the presence of a current health certificate issued by a
United States DOA accredited veterinarian. Id. at 2-4.
71. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 15.
72. Id.
73. Declaration of Jane Brackman at 2, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE).
74. The Task Force found that there were approximately 12 guide dogs belonging to
residents of Hawaii. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 16.
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Placing trained guide dogs in quarantine causes a potentially
permanent loss of effectiveness,' which jeopardizes the safety of
their owners until the dogs can be retrained.76 The Task Force
recognized the importance of the relationship between persons with
disabilities and their dogs: "Handicapped persons and their guide/
signal/service dogs are an inseparable working team.... [T]hese dogs
are essential in allowing handicapped persons to function indepen-
dently."'  The impacts of the quarantine are significant: It separates
persons with disabilities from their needed companions, destroys the
future effectiveness of the guide dog, severely limits the owner's
mobility, and imposes a heavy financial burden on persons with
disabilities.78
Guide dogs are indispensable because they literally operate as
their owner's eyes. The owner and the guide dog constitute an
inseparable working team, enabling the disabled person to function
independently.79 Guide dogs perform functions which no other
mobility aid can. For example, guide dogs immediately orient
themselves to new surroundings and can respond to such things as
traffic signals and oncoming traffic.' Relying on guide dogs often
results in diminished cane skills, increasing the danger and difficulty
75. Guide dogs lose their training during the quarantine because the limited exercise
allowed does not occur in the environment in which they need to operate, such as, public
areas. A distracted guide dog could eventually injure the handler or the public.
Declaration of Nicholas J. Terrones at 7, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE).
76. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 15.
77. Id.
78. The cost of training a guide dog is estimated to exceed $16,000. Declaration of
Don Frisk at 2, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE). The cost alone makes it critical that the
dogs are properly maintained both while in training and active service. Id. But more than
the cost, the quarantine in some instances may prevent a Hawaii resident from obtaining
an American guide dog. Guide Dogs of America does not accept applicants who must
quarantine their dog for four months upon return to their home because the quarantine
is detrimental to the training of the dogs. Declaration of Nicholas J. Terrones at 523,
Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE).
79. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 15.
80. Cherrie Pomerantz, a former President of the Guide Dog Users of California and
President of Guide Dog Users, Inc., states,
Canes don't care about traffic, guide dogs do. Recently, I was making a street
crossing (with the light), at a major four-way intersection. In the middle of the
street, my guide dog suddenly went into reverse.... A reckless driver making
a right turn would have connected with me and my guide dog if not for his quick
decision. Canes do not do this, EVER!
Declaration of Cherrie Pomerantz at 3, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE).
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visually-impaired individuals face in negotiating unfamiliar surround-
ings without the aid of a guide dog."'
Enforcement of Hawaii's outdated and unjustified quarantine
regulations forces guide dog owners to compromise personal safety
and independence. Essentially, guide dog owners have no other
option except avoiding travel to Hawaii.
The Task Force carefully evaluated the risk presented by guide
dogs.' Veterinary technology has virtually eliminated rabies in
domestic dogs from the areas in the United States from which guide
dogs likely come. 3 Guide dogs represent a small, highly monitored
segment of the domestic dog population.' Hawaii's continued
reliance on animal quarantine represents the type of stereotypical,
generalized approach to safety that the ADA aims to eliminate.85
VI. IMPACTS ON PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
The visually impaired meet the federal statutory definition of a
person with a disability: a person who has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,
has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an
impairment. 6  Federal statutes forbidding discrimination protect
these individuals.' The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA also
recognize that persons with disabilities often need special assistance,
81. Declaration of Judene Weymouth, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE). Judene
Weymouth, describing being deprived of the services of a guide dog during the three years
she lived in Hawaii, states,
I worked in Aiea, which is a difficult environment in which to get around
without a guide dog and if one does not know exactly where one is going. I got
off the bus the first day and had difficulty in finding the path I needed to travel.
My guide dog had always found that path for me. As a result, as I walked into
the Halawa industrial park, my cane missed a tree which, unfortunately, I found
with my head.
Id. at 5-6.
82. See TASK FORCE, supra note 10.
83. Id. at 15.
84. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (Supp. V 1988) ("[I]ndividuals with disabilities
continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including ... transportation, and
communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, [and] failure to make
modifications to existing facilities and practices.").
86. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988); ADA 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1988).
87. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1988) (setting forth the availability
of remedies, including injunctive relief).
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such as guide dogs, to allow them to live productive, independent
lives.'
Recognition of the adverse impact of the quarantine law on
persons with disabilities is a consistent theme throughout the Task
Force report.s9 Implementing a guide dog exemption would achieve
positive results, including increased tourism to the state, an increased
ability for visually impaired residents to travel outside Hawaii, and a
possible reduction in the cost of guide dogs for Hawaii residents.
According to a Task Force survey, exempting guide, service, and
signal dogs from the 120-day quarantine requirement would encour-
age a sizable percentage of persons with disabilities to visit the state
for business and pleasure. 90
The Hawaii District Court documented the experiences of many
visually-impaired users of guide dogs.91 Appellant Vernon Crowder
contrasted his independence using a guide dog with the indignity of
having to rely on strangers to find a hotel lobby for a cup of coffee,
or to find the bathroom.' He described being quarantined with his
dog as "disgusting and humiliating."'93 Further, Cherrie Pomerantz,
a visually-impaired person, stated:
When I am allowed to travel to Hawaii only to be hustled
off to quarantine as though I and my guide dog were
contagious, I feel offended, humiliated and completely
devalued. When I am not permitted to travel to Hawaii and
freely move about the state with my guide dog, I am
effectively denied the ability to travel to Hawaii at all.'
Further, the trial court in Crowder observed:
There's no question and it's undisputed that people who are
visually impaired and who regularly use a guide dog.., are
going to be significantly inconvenienced from conducting
themselves in the manner and mode in which they would
88. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 701(a)(6)(B) (Supp. V 1988) (stating that one goal of the
nation is to provide individuals with disabilities the tools to achieve, among other things,
economic self-sufficiency and independence).
89. See TASK FORCE, supra note 10.
90. Id. at 15; see also Declaration of Cherrie Pomerantz at 4, Crowder I (No. 93-
00213DAE) ("to permit [a visually-impaired person] to come to Hawaii, only to remove
[the] only reasonable and chosen form of mobility, is tantamount to refusing [a visually-
impaired person] access to the state.").
91. Crowder 1, 842 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Haw. 1994).
92. Declaration of Vernon Crowder at 4-5, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE).
93. ad at 6.
94. Declaration of Cherrie Pomerantz at 3-4, Crowder I (No. 93-00213DAE),
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prefer to conduct themselves .... [T]here's no question that
there is a significant inhibiting affect [sic] of these regula-
tions in spite-of the fact that the State says that you can stay
out there in the quarantine station.95
The record in Crowder clearly indicates that the quarantine law
has a substantial negative impact on visually-impaired persons.
VII. FEDERAL STATUTES MANDATING AN EXEMPTION OF THE
QUARANTINE LAW
Analysis of the legality of the Hawaiian quarantine law requires
application of two federal statues. 6 To date, no federal or Hawaiian
state case has successfully challenged the quarantine law.' Howev-
er, the two federal statutes and several constitutional theories provide
a basis for requiring an exemption from the quarantine for visually-
impaired persons' guide dogs.
A. Protection of Persons with Disabilities
The federal government has sought to remedy years of discrimi-
nation against persons with disabilities in many areas, including
employment, education, health services, transportation, and hous-
ing.98 Legislators have long recognized the need to codify these
protections to ensure that persons with disabilities have the opportuni-
ty to fully participate in society. Hawaii's animal quarantine law
conflicts with the two major federal statutes designed to provide these
protections: the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act.
1. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Congress added section 504, "the central linchpin of public
policy efforts to advance the rights of persons with mental and
95. Transcript, supra note 6, at 577-78.
96. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988).
97. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also Plaintiff's Motion for Appeal at
1-2, McKeith v. Kitagawa, No. 92-00108DAE (9th Cir. filed Mar. 3, 1992) (discussing
district court's denial of preliminary injunction against quarantine).
The one case identified that involves the quarantine station, Campbell v. Animal
Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981), is routinely cited regarding recovery of
damages for serious mental distress. In this case, a family dog was being transported to
a veterinarian from the quarantine station and died en route. k4L at 1067.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(3), 12101(a)(5) (Supp. V 1988).
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physical disabilities,"" to the Rehabilitation Act, with the purpose
of overcoming biases within the business community towards
individuals who had completed vocational rehabilitation training, by
providing that
[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the
United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subject-
ed to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity
conducted by any Executive agency .... '00
Subsequent case law and amendments have defined the scope of
section 504 since its adoption. In School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline, 1 the Supreme Court found that section 504 reflected
Congress's goal to "ensure that handicapped individuals are not
denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the
ignorance of others."'" Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone'
03
applied section 504 to any public service provided by a recipient of
federal financial assistance. Finally, in Alexander v. Choate, 4 the
Court stated, "[s]ection 504 seeks to assure evenhanded treatment and
the opportunity for handicapped individuals to participate in and
benefit from programs receiving federal assistance. '"105
Hawaii's quarantine law conflicts with section 504's goal of
protecting persons with disabilities,"° who are impacted by a
federally funded program. Whether or not section 504 applies to the
99. STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC POLICY 52 (1990).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. V 1988).
101. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
102. lM. at 284 (emphasis added).
103. 465 U.S. 624 (1984). The Supreme Court found that Consolidated Rail received
federal funds to provide termination allowances to workers who lost their jobs as a result
of its reorganization. Id. at 627. The Court reviewed the purpose of the Rehabilitation
Act, and found that the language of § 504 prohibited discrimination against the
handicapped under "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
at 632 (quoting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). The Court also found that although the
original intention of the Act was to protect against employment discrimination, all
programs receiving federal funding were included within the reach of the Act. Id. at 632-
33. In addition, the program itself did not have to be the primary recipient of the federal
funds. See id. at 633.
104. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
105. ld. at 304 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)).
106. The Rehabilitation Act and case law use the term "handicapped" rather than
"disabled." This usage is followed in this section for the purpose of consistency.
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Hawaiian quarantine depends on the presence of four issues: (1) the
presence of federally assisted programs or activities; (2) an individual
with a disability; (3) the need for access to services; and (4) the
absence of a reasonable accommodation.'0
a. Hawaii's quarantine program is a federally assisted program
Since section 504 prohibits discrimination against persons with
disabilities in programs or activities receiving federal financial
assistance, the Hawaii quarantine program must fit the definition of
a "federally assisted program" for section 504 to be applicable. A
"program or activity" consists of "all of the operations of ... a
department ... of a State."1" The Department of Justice regula-
tions, however, define federal financial assistance more broadly as
grants, loans, or contracts that make funds, personnel, or property
available.'09
According to the Department of Health and Human Services, a
"recipient" can be "any state or its political subdivision, any instru-
mentality of a state or its political subdivision, any public or private
agency, institution, organization, or other entity, or any person to
which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through
another recipient ....
107. This approach somewhat parallels the standard for a plaintiff to make out a prima
facie case under § 504. This standard requires that a plaintiff
prove (1) that [the individuall is a "handicapped individual" under the Act, (2)
that [the individual] is "otherwise qualified" for the position sought, (3) that [the
individual, was excluded from the position sought solely by reason of [the
individual's] handicap, and (4) that the program or activity in question receivesfederal financial assistance.
This standard was articulated in an employment context in Strathie v. Department of
Transp., 716 F.2d 227,230 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761,774
(2d Cir. 1981)).
108. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
109. 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(e) (1989) states:
[A]ny grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of
insurance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the agency provides
or otherwise makes available assistance in the form of:
(1) Funds;
(2) Services of Federal personnel; or
(3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property,
including:
(i) Transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market value
or for reduced consideration; and
(ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property if
the Federal share of its fair market value is not returned to the Federal
government.
110. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1994).
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Section 504 also prohibits discrimination throughout entire
agencies or institutions if any part of an agency or institution receives
federal financial assistance and distributes it to another."' Courts
have found that this type of assistance triggering application of section
504 embraces a diversity of programs, including funds received by
Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare "for a variety of
programs and purposes," ' Maine's Department of Education and
Cultural Services "for bus driver training,"".3  and Tennessee's
Medicaid program.1
A person with a disability may allege a violation of section 504
without being a beneficiary of any program under a governmental
department."' In United States v. Baylor University Medical Cen-
ter,116 although a particular complainant did not directly receive
Medicare or Medicaid benefits, the court found that this plaintiff
asserted valid section 504 violations. 17  The court explained that
"the Rehabilitation Act is intended to prohibit discrimination in
'programs which receive federal financial assistance' without limiting
that protection to the direct beneficiaries of the federal assistance. '" tl8
111. BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 3:35-3:36 (1992); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.4(a)-(b) (1994) (regulations adopted by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare).
112. Doe v. Colautti, 454 F. Supp. 621, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In Colautti, the plaintiff
challenged Pennsylvania's 60-day limitation on benefits for in-patient psychiatric care
under § 504. Id. The parties stipulated that the Department of Public Welfare received
federal funding "for a variety of programs and purposes including but not limited to
mental health programs." Id. Because of this general federal assistance, without any
specific program requirements, the court found Pennsylvania's medical assistance program
and its regulations subject to the anti-discrimination mandate of § 504. Id.
113. Jackson v. State, 544 A.2d 291, 298 (Me. 1988). Plaintiff challenged Maine's
regulation prohibiting diabetics from employment as bus drivers. Id. The court found the
Department of Education and Cultural Services subject to § 504 since the specific program,
the Transportation Division, received approximately $9,000 per year from the federal
government for bus driver training. Id. The court stated that "those federal funds were
not insulated by virtue of the fact that they were originally received by the Maine Highway
Safety Committee." Id.
114. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). "Medicaid is a joint state-federal
funding program for medical assistance in which the Federal Government approves a state
plan for the funding of medical services for the needy and then subsidizes a significant
portion of the financial obligations the State has agreed to assume." Id. at 289 n.1.
115. United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1042.
118. Id.
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Hawaii participates in a variety of federally-funded programs.
The Department of Agriculture, which oversees implementation of
the quarantine laws and operation of the quarantine station, receives
federal grants for pesticide and meat inspection programs. Although
the Animal Quarantine Station does not receive any direct federal
funding,n 9 the quarantine meets the requirement of being a federal-
ly-assisted program, since the program itself does not have to be the
primary recipient of the federal funds.2
b. Rehabilitation Act protects the visually impaired
A challenger to Hawaii's program under section 504 must fall
within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act. Section 504 defines a
person with a disability as one "who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii)
is regarded as having such an impairment." '' While it seems
obvious that a person whose visual impairment requires the assistance
of a guide dog would meet the definition of "disabled" under the
statute, it is helpful to reinforce this assumption by reviewing the
various regulations. The term "physical impairment" includes any
physiological disorder or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
body conditions including the "special sense organs."" Major life
activities involve "functions such as caring for one's self" which
includes sight."2 Since visual impairment clearly falls within the
Rehabilitation Act, and courts have determined that blindness
constitutes a disability, 4 a visually-impaired person could success-
fully challenge the quarantine statute under section 504.
119. The fees collected from the users of the quarantine station are used to offset the
cost of its operation. David M. Sasaki & John M. Gooch, Cost Effectiveness of Hawaii's
Anti-Rabies Quarantine Program, HAW. MED. J., July 1983, at 159.
120. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)
(amending § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988)).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988).
122. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A) (1994).
123. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) defines a major life activity as "functions such as caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working."
124. See Norcross v. Sneed, 573 F. Supp. 533, 536 (W.D. Ark. 1983) ("[t]he Court
specifically finds that plaintiff is 'legally blind' and is a 'handicapped individual' "); see also
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982,989 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir.
1977) ("A blind person certainly is a 'handicapped individual' as defined in [section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act].").
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c. the visually impaired need access to Hawaii's services
Another issue related to challenging the quarantine law under
section 504 is whether the individual with the disability is able to
obtain the full benefit of a program or service. Broadly defined, the
program or service that the visually-impaired person entering Hawaii
seeks to benefit from includes any and all programs or services
provided by the state legislature that a person who is not disabled can
enjoy. The quarantine regulations preclude visually-impaired guide
dog users attempting to enter Hawaii from enjoying any of the state's
programs or services.
In Alexander v. Choate,1" the Supreme Court held that a
fourteen-day limitation on the number of annual inpatient hospital
days that state Medicaid would pay hospitals on behalf of a Medicaid
recipient would not deny persons with a disability "meaningful access"
or exclude them from health services, 126 because persons with and
without disabilities would have identical, effective hospital servic-
es.127 Under the quarantine law, however, persons with disabilities
and those without disabilities do not receive equal treatment. Persons
with disabilities can neither travel to Hawaii nor accept employment
in Hawaii without experiencing an impact substantially different from
that encountered by a dog owner who is not visually impaired.
Hawaii's quarantine law prevents persons with disabilities who would
travel to and from Hawaii from fully participating in the state's
programs and services, in contrast to the arguably unreasonable but
equal treatment of both persons with disabilities and those without in
Alexander.
d. Hawaii's quarantine laws have not made reasonable
accommodation
The final question in analyzing the quarantine law is whether a
reasonable accommodation can provide a remedy. Defining "reason-
able accommodation" is one of the most troublesome issues in the
application of section 504.1" One definition requires the elimination
of existing barriers to participation in a program,121 whereas another
125. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
126. Id. at 302.
127. Id.
128. TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 111, at 5:1.
129. 1& at 5:4-5:5.
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interpretation does not demand that a federal assistance recipient
substantially modify its programs.130  To determine whether an
accommodation is reasonable, courts balance competing equities and
will not require accommodation if it will place "undue hardship" on
an entity"' or if it constitutes a "substantial modification" of the
program or service.
131
Federal regulations list factors to be considered in a section 504
challenge, such as the size and type of the organization, the budget of
the program, and the nature and cost of the accommodation required
to assist the visually-impaired person. 33 The major factor involves
the cost of the accommodation and the entity's ability to bear that
cost. The cost of the exemption would be negligible," given the
small portion of the population that would take advantage of the
quarantine exemption,35 the limited administrative procedures
needed to implement the exemption, and the methods which could be
used to offset any increased cost.136
Notwithstanding that the cost would not pose an undue hardship
in implementing an exemption to the quarantine law, Hawaii may
nevertheless claim that such a change represents a "fundamental
alteration" of its rabies control program. Federal regulations,
130. Id. at 5:5 (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 n.20).
131. Id. at 5:5-5:6.
132. See Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 405.
133. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1994) provides:
In determining pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section whether an accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on the operation of a recipient's program,
factors to be considered include: (1) [t]he overall size of the recipient's program
with respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of
budget; (2) [t]he type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and
structure of the recipient's workforce; and (3) [t]he nature and cost of the
accommodation needed.
134. In fact, both the Task Force and subsequent proposed legislative bills addressed
the cost of accommodating the exemption. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 16-18. The
Task Force proposed that the incoming individual with a disability bear all costs of medical
treatment and verify that the guide dog had the required tests and vaccinations. Id. at 17.
In the legislative bills presented, proponents suggested that fees be adopted to defray the
cost of implementing the exemption, and that the guide dog owner be responsible for all
costs. Id. The Task Force also recognized that there would be a general public cost
benefit from the exemption resulting from the decreased cost for guide dogs for Hawaiian
residents. Id. at 16-18.
135. Only users of guide dogs would qualify for this exemption.
136. Compare the examination of paperwork as compared with the expense of housing
the person with the disability, as well as caring for the guide dog for the 120-day
quarantine period. The fee for a 120-day quarantine is $456, or $3.80 per day. TASK
FORCE, supra note 10, at 10.
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however, have failed to define "fundamental alteration." '137 The
Third and Fifth Circuits, however, have assessed whether the required
or necessary accommodation violates the basic integrity of the job or
program.138 The Court in Alexander stated that
Davis ... struck a balance between the statutory rights of
the handicapped to be integrated into society and the
legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the
integrity of their programs: while a grantee need not be
required to make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifica-
tions to accommodate the handicapped, it may be required
to make "reasonable" ones.'39
The Court cited examples, including modifications to secondary
education programs, changes in the length of time for completion of
degree requirements, and adaptations to conducting courses. 4°
This approach provides a particularly helpful scheme to address
the reasonable accommodation issue as applied to Hawaii's quarantine
law. Hawaii's statutory law, the findings of the Task Force, and
statements by government officials all reinforce Hawaii's goal of
"preserv[ing the State's] rabies-free status, a public health issue which
is of critical importance.''. A challenge to this program must
address accommodations that the state has already implemented, the
substance of the proposed exemption in light of those accommo-
dations, and the level of safety required for any accommodation.
Hawaii already has made several exemptions that are nonethe-
less consistent with its rabies prevention goal. For example, the
quarantine regulations provide exemptions for circus animals and
police and military dogs,142 and the state specifically exempted two
camels from quarantine in 1988.1'
The Task Force's recommended exemption for guide dogs
similarly supports the integrity of the program. It proposes very
stringent technological and veterinary controls to prevent rabies from
137. TUCKER & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 111, at 5:10.
138. Id. at 5:11.
139. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300.
140. Id. at 300-01 n.20.
141. Letter from Yukio Kitagawa, Director, Department of Agriculture, State of
Hawaii, to Melissa McKeith (Feb. 14, 1992) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
142. See supra part II.C.
143. See supra part ILC.
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entering the state."4  It further restricts the exception to a very
small population of animals that are highly unlikely to carry ra-
bies.145
Supreme Court decisions have set forth two arguments to
challenge the quarantine: (1) the methodology proposed by the Task
Force is safe and meets the level of certainty required; and (2) the
current exceptions to the quarantine law already show Hawaii's
willingness to make exemptions which do not compromise the
essential nature of its rabies protection efforts.1" By withholding
the exemption provision from those who use guide dogs, Hawaii is
imposing a level of certainty on persons with disabilities that it does
not require of others. The Task Force report provides the state with
a nondiscriminatory proposal which would allow the safe accomplish-
ment of its goal of rabies prevention. Thus, if the state faces a
challenge to the quarantine from persons with a disability, and refuses
to exempt guide dogs, a court should find Hawaii in violation of
section 504.
2. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Not only does the quarantine law violate the Rehabilitation Act,
it also presents similar problems under the ADA. The ADA
represents the most inclusive antidiscrimination legislation since the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.147 It codifies case law decided under the
Rehabilitation Act, and further extends its commitment to removing
barriers for persons with disabilities in all areas of life."4
The ADA provides that state and local governments must give
persons with disabilities full access to programs which the entity of-
fers.149 The ADA accords civil rights protections to persons with
disabilities similar to protections provided on the basis of gender,
race, national origin, and religion under the Civil Rights Act. The
ADA guarantees equal opportunity in public accommodations,
employment, services, and telecommunications.15
144. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 16-17.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.16 (holding exclusion of employee permitted
only when significant risk of communicating infectious disease to others existed).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). The Civil Rights Act, as amended, prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. Id.
148. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. V 1988).
149. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,719-35,720 (1991) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 31).
150. See Thornburgh, supra note 4.
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The ADA's preliminary language emphasizes the legislative
intent "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for
the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties." '151 Congress specifically noted that
discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in
such critical areas as; ... transportation ... recreation.,.
and access to public services ... individuals with disabilities
continually encounter various forms of discrimination,
including . . ; overprotective rules and policies, failure to
make modifications to existing facilities and practices,
exclusionary qualification standards and criteria ... and
relegation to lesser services... [and] benefits,. .. individu-
als with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations... based
on characteristics that are beyond the control of such
individuals and resulting from stereotypical assumptions not
truly indicative of the individual ability.., to participate in,
and contribute to, society; the Nation's proper goals.., are
to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, inde-
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such
individuals.5 '
Addressing discrimination in, a full range of major life activities,
the ADA contains specific titles to cover areas such as employment,
public services, public transportation, and public accommodations and
services operated by private entities. Title II of the ADA, entitled
"Public Services," is the section used to analyze Hawaii's quarantine
law.
In contrast to the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA specifies in
detail the governmental entities covered and does not include a
federal financial assistance requirement. The ADA defines a public
entity as any state or local government, department, agency, special-
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or states or local
government. 153 The Department of Justice promulgates even more
specific regulations: "Title II is intended to apply to all programs,
activities and services provided or operated by State and local
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
152. Id. § 12101(a)(3)-(a)(8).
153. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT. TITLE II
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § 11-1.2000 (1993) [hereinafter ADA MANUAL].
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governments."' '  The state of Hawaii, its departments and their
programs, including the animal quarantine program, run by the
Department of Agriculture, fall within these guidelines.
As under the Rehabilitation Act, persons protected from
discrimination under the ADA must demonstrate their status as a
"qualified individual with a disability""15  Both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA similarly define a person with a disability. Thus,
a person who faces restrictions in the conditions, manner, or duration
of performing a major life activity has a disability. Since sight
constitutes a major life activity, a visually-impaired person is disabled
under the ADA.'56
In addition, the ADA requires that the person covered be
"qualified."'' A qualified individual with a disability is "an individ-
ual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity.1
15 8
The term "essential eligibility requirements" is the key element
of the definition. The comments to the regulations and the Title II
technical manual indicate that this is a minimal threshold for most
programs.159  Most public entities provide information about their
programs, activities, and services upon request. In such situations the
only eligibility requirement involves asking for the information."
If safety is an issue, the threshold requirement will be substantially
154. Id.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1988). The Code of Federal Regulations
summarizes the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual
with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-
related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or desires, and who,
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such
position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1995). In addition, an individual who has either a
physical or mental impairment is viewed as disabled under the ADA. The regulations,
pursuant to Title I, define physical impairment as "[a]ny physiological disorder, or
condition ... or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological ... special sense organs, [and] respiratory (including speech organs)." Id.
§ 1630.2(h)(1).
156. The ADA regulations define "major life activities" as: "functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working." Id. § 1630.2(i) (1992).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
158. Id § 12131(2).
159. See ADA MANUAL, supra note 153, § 11-2.8000.
160. Id.
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higher. In this area, Title II incorporates requirements from Title III,
which deals with entities providing public accommodation.161
3. Public safety
An entity has no obligation to provide services to an individual
who poses a "direct threat" to the health and safety of others or
himself. The ADA defines a direct threat as "a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable
accommodation."162 The ADA has essentially adopted the standard
defined by the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v.
Arline.'
63
The Court in Arline recognized the need to balance the interests
of persons with disabilities against the legitimate concern of protecting
public safety."6 The plaintiff worked as a school teacher for
thirteen years before she suffered several relapses of tuberculosis
within a two-year period."6 The school fired Arline after her third
relapse, and she alleged discrimination." According to the Court,
although "[e]mployers have an affirmative obligation to make a
reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee,"' 167 an em-
ployer may consider safety, and thus, could assess the duration of the
disease or the severity of the condition."r If a public entity cannot
eliminate the risk to others, even by making reasonable modifications
to its policies or procedures, a person with a disability will be
disqualified.
169
Authorities must determine if a person is qualified based on an
individualized assessment, not stereotypes or generalizations.170 The
individualized analysis must demonstrate reasonable judgment that
relies on current medical evidence or the best available objective
evidence to determine the nature, duration, and severity of the risk,
the probability that the potential injury will actually occur, and
whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures
161. Id. § 11-5.2000.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
163. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
164. Id. at 277.
165. Id.
166. iL at 276-77.
167. Id. at 289 n.19.
168. Id. at 287-88.
169. Id. at 287 n.16.
170. ADA MANUAL, supra note 153, § 11-2.8000.
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would mitigate the risk.' Medical and public health authorities
may be sources of assistance when making this assessment
72
Persons with disabilities are clearly the focus of the ADA. The
ADA's goal of preventing discrimination, however, must not
overshadow the importance of public safety, as both of these concerns
are important. Hawaii may emphasize public safety to buttress
opposition to a guide dog quarantine exemption. Since a guide dog
accompanies a visually-impaired person constantly and acts as an
extension of that person, Hawaii will argue strongly for public safety
considerations. However, the government's standards, as well as the
Arline three-part test, provide a rebuttal to any such argument. 73
Hawaii's quarantine law has not changed in over eighty years,
notwithstanding the current level of veterinary technology, including
effective and reliable vaccines and rabies testing. 74 An individual-
ized assessment of guide dogs would reveal a group with substantially
different characteristics-a minimal risk of rabies. Instead, Hawaii
continues to rely on generalizations about all dogs. The Task Force
recognized the extremely small risk of rabies in guide dogs given their
medical history and constant supervision."7 The extremely limited
size of the proposed exempted population 76 minimizes the probabil-
ity that any potential injury, such as rabies infection, will occur.
Hawaii's Task Force recommended reasonable modifications in
the form of stringent medical, identification, and monitoring condi-
tions.'" These methods would at least decrease, and possibly
eliminate, the risk of rabies entering Hawaii. Applying these factors
to the ADA's analysis shows that Hawaii's continued reliance on
animal quarantine represents the type of stereotypical, generalized
approach to safety that Congress intended the ADA to eliminate. 78
Whether under the lowest standard, requiring a person with a
disability to request information to meet eligibility requirements, or
the highest standard, requiring a determination that no direct threat
171. 1l
172. Id.
173. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17.
174. See supra part III.
175. See supra part IV.
176. To demonstrate the limited number of proposed exemptions, the Task Force
advances the following statistics: (1) approximately 12 guide dogs belong to residents of
Hawaii; and (2) one guide dog was confined in the quarantine station in 1988 and two in
1989. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 16.
177. Id.
178. See ADA MANUAL, supra note 153, § 11-2.8000.
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exists to public safety, the visually-impaired person with a guide dog
meets any threshold of ADA requirements and qualifies for the
ADA's protection. The ADA challenges state and local governments
to look at their requirements and ensure that "safety requirements are
based on real risks, not on speculation, stereotypes, or generalizations
about individuals with disabilities."'' 9 The current quarantine law
fails both in its approach to persons with disabilities and in recogniz-
ing that medical technology has changed since the law was adopted
over eighty years ago.
4. Undue burden
The ADA requires that all services, programs, and activities of
state and local governments be readily accessible and usable by
qualified persons with disabilities, unless doing so would result in a
fundamental alteration in the nature of the program or in undue
financial and administrative burdens.") While discussion of the
Rehabilitation Act addressed this topic,181 the ADA regulations
emphasize that accessibility should occur in "all but the most unusual
cases."" Congress clearly indicated that most accommodations
would not create an undue financial or administrative hardship. 8'
The head of the public entity bears the responsibility of defending the
lack of accommodation by substantiating in writing that an alteration
would be fundamental, or that a burden would be undue."84
The ADA strives to mainstream persons with disabilities by
integrating them into society to the fullest extent possible.85 The
drafters of the ADA recognized that special programs might be
necessary to ensure equal opportunity."6
179. Id. § 11-3.5200.
180. Id. § 11-5.1000.
181. See supra part VII.A.l.d.
182. ADA MANUAL, supra note 153, § 11-5.1000.
183. The Task Force report suggested that the person with a disability bear the cost of
the vaccines, medical records, and identification required for a quarantine exemption.
TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 18. However, to this extent the Task Force is wrong.
Under the regulations for Title II, a public entity "may not place a surcharge only on
particular individuals with disabilities ... to cover these expenses." ADA MANUAL, supra
note 153, § 11-3.5400. The regulations use examples of providing interpreter services to
the deaf, eliminating architectural barriers, and relocating classes, as types of compliance
efforts that disabled persons would not be expected to pay for individually. Id. The state
may need to increase the fees for all program participants to cover its costs. Id.
184. ADA MANUAL, supra note 153, § 11-5.1000.
185. Id. § 11-3.4000.
186. Id. § 11-3.4100.
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Even if an accommodation would represent a fundamental
alteration, the public entity may not escape its responsibilities to
persons with disabilities; the ADA requires the entity to take other
actions to ensure that persons with disabilities have access to the
benefits or services provided."8 The quarantine exemption recom-
mended by the Task Force constitutes a special program ensuring
visually-impaired persons entering Hawaii an equal opportunity to
participate in the programs and services offered by the state. The
current quarantine law purports giving equal treatment to persons
entering Hawaii with a dog; however, as demonstrated above, it
undermines the concept of mainstreaming by eliminating a visually-
impaired person's normal participation in the state's programs and
activities.
The two statutes discussed in this Article provide a basis for a
challenge to Hawaii's historical discrimination against persons with
disabilities who are unable to travel with their guide dogs. Given the
current state of medical technology, Hawaii's reliance on the
traditional quarantine for the prevention of rabies lacks reasonable
justification. Consequently, the current quarantine law implicates
various constitutional provisions which will be discussed in the next
section.
VIII. A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The quarantine statute prevents persons who use guide dogs
from entering or leaving Hawaii, which clearly contradicts the
protections provided by the United States Constitution.'" This
Article will first explore the protections provided by the Commerce
Clause l"9 to residents of the United States who wish to move among
the states, then analyze the similar protections afforded by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. '
Historically, these two provisions protected the right to. travel.' 9'
This Article will then discuss the equal protection and due process
187. Id. § 11-5.1000.
188. See infra part VIII.A-D.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
190. Id. amend. XIV.
191. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Whereas the majority found the
protection of the right to travel in the Commerce Clause, id. at 172, four Justices found
the protection in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 178.
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provisions in the context of Hawaii's quarantine law to protect the
rights of persons with disabilities to travel to and from Hawaii,
A. The Commerce Clause
1. Overview of the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce ... among the several
States . .. ."" Congressional exercise of its power pursuant to the
Commerce Clause preempts inconsistent state legislation affecting
commerce. 93 "The Commerce Clause long has been held to be self-
executing... [t]hus, even in the absence of preemptive legislation it
bars state regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce.
194
Similarly, "Congress may authorize the States to engage in regulation
that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid."' 5
Congress designed the Commerce Clause to prevent states from
enacting legislation that needlessly obstructs interstate trade, or from
attempting to place themselves in a position of economic isolation." 6
The Commerce Clause specifically recognizes the potential conflicts
that arise ifeach state acts simply to advance its own local inter-
ests.' 7 State laws intended to protect the profitability of a state's
own business or economy are invalid pursuant to the Commerce
Clause."8 The courts act as final arbiters of competing demands of
state and national interests.19
The Commerce Clause applies to the interstate movement of
people as well as goods. In Crandall v. Nevada,' the Court
reviewed a Nevada statute that required payment of a tax for each
person leaving the state or passing through it.2 ' The Court found
192. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
193. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Nebraska, 802 F.2d 994, 999 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding federal statute affecting commerce preempts conflicting state law).
194. Id This self-executing feature of the Commerce Clause is often referred to as the
dormant commerce clause.
195. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). However, the Court noted that "[a]n
unambiguous indication of congressional intent is required before a federal statute will be
read to authorize otherwise invalid state legislation." Id. at 139.
196. Id. at 151 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
197. Burlington, 802 F.2d at 1004.
198. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Board of Agric., 590 F. Supp. 778,784 (D. Haw. 1984).
199. Burlington, 802 F.2d at 999 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945)).
200. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
201. Id. at 36.
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that the federal government has the authority to send people freely
throughout the states and that
the citizen also had correlative rights. He has the right to
come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may
have upon that government, or to transact any business he
may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices,
to engage in administering its furictions. He has"a right to
free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations
of foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the
sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the
courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its
nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil
he must pass in the exercise of it.2"
The majority opinion did not place this right firmly within the
Commerce Clause, but the concurring opinion stated that the law "is
inconsistent with the power conferred upon Congress to regulate
commerce among the several States .. .. "203
In Edwards v. California,2' the Court firmly held that the
transportation of people fell under the Commerce Clause.20 5 In that
case, the plaintiff went to Texas to pick up his brother-in-law and
bring him back home to California.2 °6 He was convicted of violating
a California statute that forbade bringing indigent persons into the
state.20 7 Justice Byrnes, writing for the majority, held that the
statute violated the Commerce Clause: "We think this statute must
fall under any known test of the validity of State interference with
interstate commerce."2" The concurring opinion from Justice
Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Murphy, agreed that the right
to interstate travel should be recognized, but found its protection
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, not under the Commerce Clause'-an approach
which will be explored in the next section.
Similarly, the Hawaii statute forbids a certain group of people
from travelling in or out of a state. In fact, the practical effect of
202. hL at 44.
203. Id. at 49 (Clifford, J., concurring).
204. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
205. Id. at 172.
206. Id at 170.
207. 1& at 171.
208. Id. at 174.
209. IM. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Hawaii's statute is to either prevent people with guide dogs from
entering the state or, if they do enter, locking the dogs up for 120
days and thus requiring the visually-impaired person to be dependent
or unable to move about freely.
State laws that only incidentally burden commerce may not
violate the Commerce Clause. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.210 sets
forth the general criteria used to evaluate such state laws.
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits .... If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
a lesser impact on interstate activities.21
The "[s]tates' power to regulate commerce is greatest when they
act on matters of local concern ... and state regulations enacted to
promote public health -and safety are accorded particular defer-
ence." '212 Courts will override this deference only when the effect
of the safety measure is slight and the burden on interstate commerce
is massive.213
The burden on interstate commerce is at its greatest when, as
here, interstate commerce and travel are prohibited entirely.
214
Hawaii's quarantine law prohibits people from travelling to the state
and residents from leaving the state. As explained above, this law
prevents people with visual impairments who use guide dogs from
enjoying the benefits of interstate travel. That is, non-Hawaii
residents who use guide dogs will choose to travel elsewhere so as to
avoid Hiwaii's 120-day quarantine. Similarly, the law deters residents
210. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
211. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
212. Burlington, 802 F.2d at 999 (citations omitted); see also Winkler v. Colorado Dep't
of Health, 564 P.2d 107, 110-11 (Colo. 1977) (holding that law prohibiting importation of
pets for resale showed a legitimate public interest which outweighed any collateral impact
on interstate commerce, and implying that "administrative convenience" alone is not a
valid justification for burdening interstate commerce).
213. Burlington, 802 F.2d at 1000 (referring to the Illinois statute at issue in Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959)).
214. Safeway, 590 F. Supp. at 786 n.2.
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with guide dogs from leaving Hawaii because those residents would
lose the use of their dogs for the 120 days upon their return to
Hawaii.
Further, there must be a real and demonstrated health or safety
objective. In Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice,21 1 the
statute failed because the state did not rebut the challengers'
considerable evidence that the regulation did not further the state's
safety objective"16 The Court expressly rejected the assertion that
it must defer to state safety legislation without weighing the burden
on interstate commerce.2 7 However, Justice Blackmun wrote a
separate opinion, joined by four other Justices, stating that "if safety
justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second-guess
legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with
related burdens on interstate commerce.,
21 8
Clearly, the courts can "look to the practical operation and
enforcement of a law in order to divine ,its real purpose. 21 9  In
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways,'0 the Court stated that "the
incantation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety does
not insulate a state law from Comnerce Clause attack. Regulations
designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless may further the
purpose so marginally, and interfere with commerce so substantially,
as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause."'" The Court refused
to grant a regulation the deference normally accorded the legislature's
judgment in matters of highway safety.' The Court reasoned that
the state law was costly and inefficient, imposing a burden on
interstate commerce "without any significant countervailing safety
interest."'
Courts limit their evaluation of state safety legislation to an
analysis of whether the state legitimately acted in furtherance of
215. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
216. Id. at 444-45.
217. Id. at 443.
218. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But see Burlington, 802 F.2d at 1004
(holding that district court erred in not examining burden on interstate commerce when
the statute at issue was enacted for purely public safety reasons).
219. Safeway, 590 F. Supp. at 784 (stating that the court is free to disregard the
legislature's statement of purpose if it considers the statement to be pretext); see also
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 149 (disapproving of "post hoc rationalization" when justifying laws).
220. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
221. Id. at 670.
222. Id. at 675-76.
223. Id. at 678.
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safety objectives. 4 Importantly, the evaluation does not involve a
comparative analysis of legislative alternatives.' Courts at times
will examine whether less discriminatory means exist to achieve the
state's stated purpose in enacting a law. 6  Typically, however,
courts do not expect a state to employ less discriminatory means if the
development would involve a considerable period of time, 7 or
when there is no assurance as to their effectiveness.m
2. Hawaii's quarantine law and the Commerce Clause
Hawaii's quarantine law requires a 120-day quarantine of dogs
and cats upon entry into the state to prevent the introduction of
rabies. ' 9 This law must fail scrutiny because it places a massive
burden on interstate commerce and the movement of persons to and
from the state with an illusory health and safety benefit.
Rabies,; although a serious disease, is not a major health
problem in the continental United States or Hawaii." ° Further, like
New Jersey in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, ' Hawaii is not
evenhandedly imposing upon its own animals the same restrictions it
places on animals entering the state. 2
The 120-day quarantine law should be invalidated under the
Commerce Clause because the law places a massive burden on
interstate commerce. It prevents people who use guide dogs from
traveling to and from Hawaii-the law precludes the interstate travel
of both residents and nonresidents of Hawaii who use guide dogs. 3
The quarantine system has not intercepted a case of rabies since
its inception.' A critical court should find Hawaii's stated safety
purpose illusory, especially when circus, police, and celebrities'
224. Burlington, 802 F.2d at 999-1000.
225. Id. at 1003.
226. See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; see also Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. New York,
658 F. Supp. 1441, 1447 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding New York's law because it was the
least restrictive alternative).
227. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 143.
228. Id. at 147 (stating that states are "not required to develop new and unproven
means of protection at an uncertain cost").
229. See DOA RULES, supra note 17, §§ 4-18-1, 4-18-2 (1981).
230. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 6 ("There have been no identified indigenous dog
exposure cases in the United States since at least 1965.").
231. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
232. Id. at 626-27.
233. See supra part VI.
234. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 8.
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animals receive exemptions from the law"5  An illusory safety
purpose violates the Commerce Clause? 6
Other alternatives, such as vaccination requirements, that have
less effect on the right to travel would achieve Hawaii's stated
purpose.37 The legislature adopted the law over eighty years ago,
and medical technology has changed drastically since then. Thus,
there are no uncertain time or cost factors, or lack of scientifically
accepted techniques which would prevent the adoption of less
burdensome means.
Furthermore, the law restricts access of Hawaii residents to the
guide dog market. A Hawaii resident who wants to obtain a guide
dog from outside the state must wait the standard 120 days to obtain
it. To avoid such a delay, these individuals will obtain Hawaiian -bred
and -trained guide dogs when they otherwise would advance interstate
commerce by obtaining a dog from outside the state. Using the Pike
factors,"8 while the quarantine law may arguably advance prevent-
ing the spread of rabies, the burden on interstate commerce clearly
outweighs that interest.
Subject to the regular Commerce Clause analysis, the burden
that Hawaii's law imposes on interstate commerce clearly outweighs
the claimed local safety benefits of the law. Additionally, alternative
means that do not significantly burden the fundamental right to travel
enjoyed by all citizens of the United States exist to further the goals
of the law. 9
B. Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The right to move freely also stems from the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2  As Justice
Douglas stated in Edwards v. California,24t "when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted in 1868, it had been squarely and authorita-
tively settled that the right to move freely from State to State was a
right of national citizenship. As such it was protected by the
235. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
236. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981).
237. See infra part VIII.C.l.d.
238. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
239. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 160-61 (1941).
240. The Fourteenth Amendment states "1n]o state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S.
CONST. amend XIV.
241. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against state interference.
2 2
In Twining v. New Jersey, 3 the Court provided a list of
judicially recognized privileges and immunities. The right to pass
freely from state to state appears first on the list.2' In a more
recent case, the Court again observed that "[t]he constitutional right
to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the
highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing
so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly
recognized."'245
Although in past years courts have analyzed the right to travel
from an equal protection standpoint, it is likely that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause helped to support those decisions. In the first case
enunciating the equal protection safeguards for the right to travel,
Justice Brennan cited the concurring opinion in Edwards, which
discussed the right to travel as a privilege of national citizenship.
246
Constitutional scholars have argued that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause provides the appropriate vehicle to protect the rights of
national citizenship.247
The Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a citizen's right
to travel among the states.2' In applying the clause to Hawaii's
quarantine law, it is clear that the law impermissibly restricts this
national right. Whether a court chooses to use the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, the Commerce Clause or, as to be discussed at
length next, the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause,
Hawaii's quarantine law is unconstitutional.
242. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring).
243. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
244. Id. at 97.
245. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).
246. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 164.
247. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37
CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 794 (1987) (the Privileges and Immunities Clause secures, among
other things, the right to interstate travel); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992) (the Privileges or Immunities Clause
requires every state to give the same rights to all its citizens).
248. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 757; Edwards, 314 U.S. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring);
Twining, 211 U.S. at 97.
NO DOGS ALLOWED
C. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
states that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."249 The Supreme Court, however, has never required that a
particular statute treat every person identically in all circumstanc-
es."5 As a result, when evaluating the legitimacy of a statute or
law, the Court will employ one of three main forms of scrutiny under
the traditional equal protection analysis. The level of deference
applied varies according to the nature of the classification, the class
discriminated against, and the asserted state interests5 1
This Article will explain how Hawaii's quarantine law fails all
three levels of scrutiny and, thus, should be deemed unconstitutional
as applied to persons with disabilities5 2 Furthermore, this Article
will describe the discriminatory impact on persons with disabilities of
both Hawaii's quarantine law and its exemptions.
1. The strict scrutiny test
The Supreme Court will apply the strict scrutiny test, or a
"heightened" review to a legislative classification, when the classifica-
tion impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right,
or operates to disadvantage a "suspect class." 53  Furthermore, a
court will only subject a classification to strict scrutiny if it finds the
legislature "intended" to discriminate against a particular group.5
Hawaii's current quarantine law both burdens a suspect class, persons
with disabilities, and interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right-the right to travel. Moreover, the Department of Agriculture's
"administration" of the quarantine law demonstrates a legislative
intent to discriminateP5
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
250. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
251. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
252. Please note, however, that this Article assumes "travelers with disabilities" or
"guide dog users" involve both Hawaii residents traveling from Hawaii to the mainland
and those individuals traveling from the mainland to Hawaii.
253. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (finding that
generally courts construe race and national origin as suspect classes).
254. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
255. See supra part ILB-C.
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When applying the strict scrutiny test, courts will uphold a
statute only if it is necessary to attain a compelling governmental
interest, and the state employs the least discriminatory means of
administering the law. 6 A state purpose may be legitimate and
substantial; however, it cannot employ means that overwhelmingly
stifle fundamental personal liberties. 7
Hawaii's quarantine law cannot survive heightened review. The
statute distinguishes between the visually impaired, who cannot
function without a nonexempt guide dog, and those individuals whoseanimals are exempt. Furthermore, since the exemptions are adminis-
tered in a discriminatory manner, the classification will be deemed
"suspect."
Nevertheless, Hawaii asserts that its state interest to eradicate
"contagious, infectious, and communicable diseases among animals"
is compelling."8  Its refusal to consider a less drastic alternative,
such as the use of vaccinations, coupled with stringent reporting and
testing requirements, suggests that Hawaii has not chosen the best
"means" to achieve its state interest. The following discussion will
more thoroughly exemplify how Hawaii's quarantine law fails the
strict scrutiny test.
a. persons with disabilities constitute a suspect class
In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 9 the Supreme
Court discussed various factors that would trigger application of strict
scrutiny to a legislative classification. The Court stated that "preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."26
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Mugia261 provided a
more recent description of a suspect class. The Court characterized
256. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,395 U.S. 621,633 (1969) (holding that
statute restricting voters in school board election is not narrowly tailored to compelling
state interest of having concerned voters); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969)
(finding that denial of welfare benefits to those not residing in the state for at least one
year did not further a compelling state interest).
257. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
258. HAw. REV. STAT. § 142-3 (1985).
259. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
260. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
261. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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a suspect class as one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to
such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such
a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.
' 262
As previously noted, the ADA aims to remove barriers for
persons with disabilities in all aspects of life.263 In granting civil
rights protections to persons with disabilities similar to those given to
individuals on the basis of race, sex, and national origin, the ADA
states that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular
minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations ...
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individu-
als and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of
the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society., 264 A congressional finding within the ADA
making persons with disabilities a suspect class warrants the imposi-
tion of strict scrutiny and furnishes a legitimate basis to apply strict
scrutiny to Hawaii's current quarantine law.
b. purposeful discrimination
Even though persons with disabilities constitute a suspect class,
a court will not deem a classification suspect absent legislative intent
to discriminate against the disfavored group.265 Legislative intent to
discriminate can be inferred from state administration of a law in a
discriminatory manner. Thus, a law may be facially neutral, but still
violate the Equal Protection Clause due to its manner of administra-
tion.26
262. Id. at 313 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28).
263. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2)(a)(7) (Supp. V 1988) (emphasis added).
265. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 704-27 (12th ed. 1991).
266. For example, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), demonstrates how a
facially neutral law results in purposeful discrimination due to its manner of administration.
In that case, a San Francisco ordinance prohibited a laundry to be operated in a wooden
building without the consent of the Board of Supervisors. Id at 358. The Board granted
permits to all but one of the non-Chinese applicants. Id. at 359. In contrast, the Board
did not grant permits to any of the 200 Chinese applicants. Id. In finding discrimination
in administration of the law, the Court found that
the facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively against a
particular class of persons as to warrant and require the conclusion, that... they
are applied by the public authorities charged with their administration.., with
a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State
of [equal protection] .... Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance ... it is applied and administered ... with an evil eye and an
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While Hawaii's current quarantine law appears facially neutral,
its administration is discriminatory. The law does not differentiate
among animals based on breed, size, age, or traits of the owner,
67
and it expressly includes guide dogs despite the devastating effect this
inclusion has on otherwise capable and independent persons with
disabilities.' 6
Although Hawaii has made special exemptions to the quarantine,
it administers the exemptions in a discriminatory manner. Hawaii has
exempted some questionable categories of animals,269 while refusing
to exempt guide dogs which have no history of rabies exposure, pose
virtually no risk of rabies due to their prolonged periods of confine-
ment and training, and can obtain a health certification from a
veterinarian.
Hawaii might argue that the quarantine law accommodates the
needs of the visually impaired who own guide dogs by providing an
opportunity to exercise the animals.' As previously discussed,27
the quarantine facility does not allow the mobility sought by persons
with disabilities and it compromises the training of the guide dogs.
272
Finally, Hawaii's quarantine law distinguishes the risk of rabies
associated with guide dogs from the risks associated with circus
animals, police, and military dogs. Legislative history makes no
mention of any attempt by Hawaii to investigate the risk of contagion
posed by exotic animals as opposed to guide dogs. Nonetheless, the
standards to which military dog handlers and circus animal trainers
must adhere do not guarantee the prevention of rabies. During a
performance, circus animals might possibly cross the barrier between
the arena and the audience. Similarly, the exemption permitting
offsite police dog training increases the likelihood that the animal
might escape. Although the exempted animals face seemingly high
restrictions, no guarantee exists to ensure that they will not introduce
rabies into the state. Apparently, Hawaii is willing to assume the risk
unequal hand.
Id. at 373-74.
267. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-2 (1981).
268. Id. § 4-18-12.
269. See supra part II.C.
270. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-12.
271. See supra part II.B.
272. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 15 (recognizing that guide dogs are essential in
allowing persons with disabilities to function independently and that there is a danger of
guide dogs losing their effectiveness after they undergo quarantine).
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associated with the current exemptions, while it resists the negligible
risk associated with the exemption of guide dogs.
c. police power as a compelling state interest
Hawaii Civil Code section 142-2 empowers the Department of
Agriculture (Department) to regulate inspection and quarantine of
animals in Hawaii."3 More importantly, the Code imposes a duty
on the Department to work toward the "eradication of contagious,
infectious and communicable diseases among animals."'274 Hawaii
will certainly assert that the preservation of a rabies-free state
constitutes a critically important public health concern.
Generally, a state will exercise its police power to protect against
any incident or use which is "injurious to the health, morals, or safety
of the community."2 5  In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, ' 6 the
Court stated that "[t]o justify the State in... interposing its authority
in [sic] behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of
the public... require such interference; and, second, that the means
are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals."'
While stopping short of delineating specific criteria, the Court
has often imposed a three-part "reasonableness" standard.27 The
Goldblatt Court stated that to evaluate a statute's reasonableness, one
must consider "the nature of the menace against which it will protect,
the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic protective steps,
and the loss which appellants will suffer from the imposition of the
ordinance."279 Applying this standard, Hawaii's quarantine law does
not appear reasonable.
First, the scope of the "rabies menace" opens considerable
debate. In 1912, when Hawaii implemented the regulations, rabies
posed a serious threat to public health.' Today, however, rabies
does not constitute a major health problem. 8' The Task Force's
273. HAw. REV. STAT. § 142-2 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
274. HAWv. REV. STAT. § 142-3 (1985).
275. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 593 (1962) (quoting Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887)).
276. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
277. Id. at 594-95 (quoting Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)).
278. Id. at 595.
279. Id.
280. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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findings and statistical data corroborate this assertion.2" Second,
the visually impaired suffer a deprivation of independence and safety
provided by their guide dogs. Finally, the 120-day quarantine is not
necessary to preserve a rabies-free society, and is unduly oppressive
upon disabled individuals. 3 This Article will propose a less drastic
alternative that will enable Hawaii to achieve its state interest.
d. necessary means versus a less drastic alternative
Even assuming that Hawaii's interest is compelling, the state
must pass another test to survive strict scrutiny-the suspect classifica-
tion must be shown as necessary to promote the compelling state
interest.' However, developing a "less drastic alternative" requires
a prior evaluation of the quarantine law's legislative history.
Although section 142 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes grants the
Department broad authority to regulate the importation and
exportation of animals, it limits that power in various respects.
Section 142-4 requires an inspection of all "domestic animal[s]" upon
entry into the state, but it stipulates that no "delays [shall be] caused,
concerning the landing of any domestic animal for which a certificate
of health has been issued." 5 The Civil Code empowers the De-
partment to quarantine only those animals "known to be or suspected
of being infected with a contagious, infectious, or communicable
disease." 6  If Hawaii simply adhered to the limitations, no
discriminatory conduct would arise.
However, the Department exercises these limitations without any
regard for or knowledge about the health of the quarantined
animals,' and thwarts the original legislative intent. The legislature
did not intend the quarantine to burden the importation of animals
demonstrably free from disease.2 Therefore, the Department's
patent disregard of the limitations imposed by the legislature creates
an undue burden on visually-impaired users of guide dogs.
Hawaii's contention that the 120-day quarantine is the means
"necessary" to preserve a rabies-free state has outgrown its use. At
282. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
283. See supra part IV.
284. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
285. HAW. REV. STAT. § 142-4 (Supp. 1992).
286. Id. § 142-2.
287. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-7 (1987).
288. HAW. REV. STAT. § 142-2 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
NO DOGS ALLOWED
the time of its creation, the 120-day quarantine provided the only
available means to combat the spread of rabies in Hawaii. 9
Compelling statistics, however, demonstrate that the quarantine is an
outdated and ineffective method to combat rabies.2 9°
All of the World Health Organization policies require vaccina-
tions in order to transfer animals between countries of differing rabies
statuses.29' Comparisons of countries with a six-month quarantine
and those with a vaccination requirement revealed no significant
differences between the number of rabid dogs imported.29  The
additional quarantine requirement in Hawaii is therefore not a
"necessary means."
Hawaii will claim that vaccinations are not one-hundred percent
effective due to varying storage procedures, animal species, and
vaccine types.293 However, due to varying incubation periods of the
rabies virus, the 120-day quarantine also falls short of a one-hundred
percent guaranteed prevention against rabies.
Hawaii should acknowledge the viability of the proposed
exemption and its stringent requirements. Mandatory proof of a
rabies vaccination plus a valid United States health certificate would
fulfill the original intent of Hawaii's legislature that the quarantine
apply to "any domestic animal khown to be affected with ... any
contagious, infectious, or communicable disease."2' The Task
Force's findings indicate that the current quarantine law does not
constitute a "necessary" means to achieve its compelling state interest.
Therefore, Hawaii's quarantine law and its exceptions would fail the
strict scrutiny test.
2. The fundamental right to travel
As noted earlier, when the state employs a classification that
burdens the exercise of fundamental rights, a court must apply strict
judicial scrutiny.295 Although the Constitution does not explicitly
enumerate the "freedom of interstate migration," the Supreme Court
289. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 8.
290. See supra parts II-IV.
291. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 21.
292. Id. at 22.
293. Letter from Robert M. Nakamura, D.V.M., M.S., Ph.D., to Senator Donna Ikeda,
Chairperson of Agriculture (Feb. 13, 1990) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review).
294. HAW. REV. STAT. § 142-6 (1985).
295. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16.
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has repeatedly treated it as a fundamental right.29 In the Passenger
Cases,297 the Court supported the guarantee of the right to interstate
migration, stating that "[w]e are all citizens of the United States; and,
as members of the same community, [we] must have the right to pass
and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as
in our own States.""29  Similarly, in Zobel v. Williams,2' the Court
held that the right to travel "protect[s] persons against the erection of
actual barriers to interstate movement."3'
A state implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such
travel or when it uses any classification that penalizes the exercise of
that right. In Shapiro v. Thompson,0' Connecticut, Pennsylvania,
and the District of Columbia enacted a one-year residency require-
ment for the receipt of welfare benefits.3°  The states asserted an
interest to deter the migration of indigents in order to preserve their
fiscal integrity?"3 According to the Court, the requirement impaired
the "fundamental right of interstate movement."a" Because the
statute impaired the freedom of travel, the Court applied strict scruti-
ny.3
05
In Shapiro the state failed the strict scrutiny test on two grounds:
(1) it could not assert a compelling state interest for its classifica-
tion;3" and (2) the means employed were not necessary to achieve
the interest.3 7 The Court found that "the class of barred newcom-
ers is all-inclusive, lumping the great majority who come to the State
for other purposes with those who come for the sole purpose of
collecting higher benefits.' '31 The durational residency requirement
penalized indigents for exercising their right to migrate.3,9  The
Shapiro Court emphasized that many families depend on welfare aid
296. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-31; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,757 (1966); Kent
v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958).
297. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
298. Id. at 492.
299. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
300. IL at 60 n.6.
301. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
302. Id. at 622-23.
303. Id. at 627.
304. Id. at 638.
305. Id.
306. eL at 633.
307. lt at 638.
308. Id. at 631.
309. d. (emphasis added).
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to obtain the "very means to subsist-food, shelter, and other necessi-
ties of life.
' 310
Likewise, in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,3 ' the
Court invalidated an Arizona statute that required indigents to reside
in-state for one year prior to receiving free nonemergency care. The
Court held that the denial of medical care infringed on the right to
travel,3 12 and accordingly applied strict scrutiny.313  The Court
determined that "[the state did] not [meet its] heavy burden... [of]
demonstrat[ing] that ... in pursuing legitimate objectives, [it] ha[d]
chosen means which [did] not unnecessarily impinge on constitutional-
ly protected interests.,
314
Perhaps the most critical issue involved in Memorial Hospital
was the articulation of the type of penalty which would trigger strict
scrutiny and most likely result in a statute's invalidation.315  That
Court maintained that a penalty exists when it affects a "necessity of
life., 316  Both Shapiro and Memorial Hospital involve temporary
deprivations of vital benefits and rights which in turn penalize
migration.1 7 The temporary nature of the penalization did not
deter the Court from imposing strict scrutiny. 8
Hawaii's current quarantine law penalizes guide dog users' right
to interstate migration. Shapiro and Memorial Hospital both involved
"residents," whereas guide dog users traveling to Hawaii are usually
"visitors." Nevertheless, assuming a guide dog user planned to move
to Hawaii, the quarantine would impose a severe, perhaps insur-
mountable, impediment. The quarantine law also penalizes a visually-
impaired Hawaii resident who owns a guide dog because the 120-day
requirement impedes the ability to travel outside the state. 19
The quarantine law penalizes a disabled person's right to travel
in several ways. The manner in which Hawaii administers its
quarantine law parallels Shapiro, lumping together individuals who
travel to Hawaii with rabies-free animals along with those who travel
310. Id. at 627.
311. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
312. Id. at 261-62.
313. Id. at 262 n.21.
314. Id. at 269.
315. Id. at 258-62.
316. 1& at 259-62.
317. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
318. Memorial Hospital, 415 U.S. at 259-62; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
319. See supra part II.A-C.
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to Hawaii with animals that pose a rabies threat. As stated previ-
ously, Hawaii exercises the quarantine without regard to the animal's
health. 20 Consequently, the person with a disability has no oppor-
tunity to prove a guide dog is rabies-free. As in Shapiro, the state has
not tailored its means to further its asserted interest.
By requiring a 120-day quarantine, Hawaii effectively takes away
the eyes and the independence of a person with a disability.
Although visual and mobile ability may not qualify as fundamental
rights, they are certainly basic necessities of life. Without the guide
dog, the individual with a disability cannot enjoy Hawaii's benefits
and privileges since the guide dog provides safety and guides the
individual around unfamiliar territory.
The housing accommodation at the quarantine station site is an
inadequate substitute for traveling outside its premises. Citizens
depend on the ability to move freely and function independently.
Providing housing for guide dog owners at the quarantine station, as
a sole alternative, severely limits the ability of a person with a
disability to travel through other parts of the state.32
Hawaii's quarantine law triggers a strict scrutiny analysis since
it violates a guide dog user's right to travel. The following case shows
that a court will invalidate a statute if the state fails to prove that it
used necessary means to achieve the state's interest.
In New York v. Soto-Lopez,322 the New York Constitution and
civil service law granted a civil service employment preference to New
York residents who were honorably discharged veterans.3z' The
preference, however, only applied to those veterans who were New
York residents at the time they entered the military.324 The plain-
tiffs included army veterans and long-time New York residents who
were not New York residents when they joined the army.
31
Applying strict scrutiny, the Court invalidated the prefer-
ence.326 The Court held that "[b]ecause New York could accom-
plish its purposes without penalizing the right to migrate by awarding
special credits to all qualified veterans, the State is not free to
promote its interests through a preference system that incorporates a
320. See supra part II.A.
321. See supra part II.A-C.
322. 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
323. Id. at 900.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id at 911.
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prior residence requirement."327 The means employed by New York
were not "necessary" to promote its interests.3'
The foregoing analysis relied on the presumption that strict
scrutiny provides the appropriate standard of review for this statute.
However, if strict scrutiny is not the appropriate level of analysis, the
intermediate scrutiny test must be considered.
3. The intermediate scrutiny test
Unlike strict scrutiny, the intermediate scrutiny test requires that
the statute seek to achieve an "important," rather than compelling,
objective and that the means are "substantially related," rather than
necessary, to that objective.329 The state also must marshal credible
supporting evidence to demonstrate a substantial relationship between
the classification and the state interest.330  Under intermediate
scrutiny, a statute placing exceptional burdens on a recognized group
"in furtherance of proper state objectives must be more 'carefully
tuned to alternative considerations.' "33
In the past the Court has applied this middle level of scrutiny to
certain classifications that give rise to recurring constitutional
difficulties such as those based on alienage, gender, and illegitima-
cy. 3  The sensitive status of these groups may not alone justify an
intermediate scrutiny analysis.333 When coupled with the denial of
an important interest that shares a close nexus with the exercise of
constitutional rights, however, heightened scrutiny is appropriate.3 4
Although these groups may not qualify as a "discrete and insular
minority,, 335 they resemble minorities that warrant more than a
327. Id. at 910 (emphasis added).
328. 1& at 911.
329. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) ("Although classifications based on
illegitimacy are not subject to 'strict scrutiny,' they nevertheless are invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment if they are not substantially related to permiisible state
interests."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,197 (1976) ("Classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives.").
330. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197-99.
331. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977)).
332. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1982) (noting that certain forms of
legislative classifications must further a "substantial interest of the state").
333. Comment, Intermediate Equal Protection Scrutiny of Welfare Laws that Deny
Subsistence, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1547, 1550 (1984).
334. Id..
335. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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mere rational basis review.336 Courts will apply a "somewhat
heightened review"337 if a group shares some suspect class character-
istics.
338
In Craig v. Boren,339 the Court applied intermediate scrutiny
to an Oklahoma statute forbidding the sale of nonintoxicating 3.2%
beer to males under the age of twenty-one and females under the age
of eighteen.' The state asserted an interest in promoting traffic
safety based on statistics showing the higher incidence of arrest of
males than females between the ages of twelve and twenty for driving
under the influence. 4  Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the
statute, stating "appellees' statistics in our view cannot support theconclusion that the gender-based distinction closely serves to achieve
that objective and therefore the distinction cannot.., withstand [an]
equal protection challenge." 2  The overall fit between the means
of regulation was not substantially related to the end.
The Court relied on several indicia to justify an intermediate
level of scrutiny. It stated that "outdated misconceptions concerning
the role of females in the -home... were.., incapable of supporting
state statutory schemes that were premised upon their accuracy.
',1 3
The Court further implied that it would apply intermediate scrutiny
to classifications reflecting inaccurate stereotypes that are not truly
indicative of a group's abilities.' Although Craig held that inter-
mediate scrutiny applies to gender classifications, other instances also
warrant an intermediate review. The Court may also apply intermedi-
ate scrutiny to classifications that implicate a fundamental right. 5
336. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-31, 1594-98 (2d
ed. 1988).
337. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1984).
338. IL
339. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
340. Id. at 197-99.
341. Ld. at 200-01.
342. Id. at 200.
343. Id. at 198-99.
344. See id.
345. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Court invalidated a statute that denied
illegal alien children access to free education. ld. at 230. To justify applying intermediate
scrutiny, the Court reasoned that illegal alien children approached a quasi-suspect status,
that education was an important right, and that the law created a new underclass or
subclass of illiterates. Id. at 217-23.
The Court concluded that illegal alien children shared at least some suspect
characteristics because they had no political power, and could not change the classifying
characteristic of illegality. Id. at 219-20. Furthermore, the Court argued that the law "is
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Persons with disabilities qualify as a quasi-suspect class because
they share a characteristic of a suspect class-immutability. Further,
they possess traits over which they have no control and confront
inaccurate and archaic stereotypes that are "not truly indicative of
their abilities."" 6 Additionally, Hawaii's current quarantine law and
its refusal to exempt guide dogs impairs the travel rights of guide dog
users, and directly prevents them from functioning independently in
society. Comparable to Plyler, Hawaii's quarantine law impairs
important interests of persons with disabilities.
The guide dog is indispensable to its owner's physical, social, and
economic well-being. Further, guide dogs and their owners constitute
an inseparable working team. Suppose that the guide dog user
traveled to Hawaii for an important business meeting. Since Hawaii
has no current exemptions for guide dogs, the animal would face the
120-day quarantine. Because the guide dog cannot leave the
quarantine site, the owner is unable to attend the business meeting.
Not only does this directly impair the disabled person's right to travel,
it indirectly impairs the right of the individual "to engage in any of
the common occupations of life."' 3
directed against children, and imposes its discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal
characteristic over which children can have little control." Id. at 220. The Court did not
solely rely on the fact illegal alien children constituted a quasi-suspect class. Instead, Plyler
recognized that the statute also burdened the important right of education. Id. at 221-24.
Although the Constitution does not explicitly enumerate education as a fundamental
right, the Court stressed the importance of education when it stated that "education has
a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society." Id. at 221. In addition, the
Court acknowledged "the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions,
and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child." Id. The Court conceded
that education was indispensable to the individual's social, economic, intellectual, and
psychological well-being. Id. at 221-22. Most importantly, the Court justified the
application of intermediate scrutiny because of education's close nexus with the exercise
of fundamental rights. I at 217-24.
The Court cautioned that denial of education to a discrete class of children creates
an obstacle to individual achievement, and makes it difficult to reconcile, within the
framework of Equal Protection Clause equality, the cost or principle of a status-based
denial of basic education. lI at 221-22. Moreover, the Court stated "it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education." Id. at 223 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
346. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
347. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (stating that the Court has repeatedly recognized that the right
of individual to engage in work falls within concept of liberty guaranteed in Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630,641 (1914) (recognizing that "all men
are entitled to the equal protection of the law in their right to work for the support of
themselves and families").
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Thus, Hawaii's current quarantine law and its exemptions burden
an important right of a group at least approaching quasi-suspect
status. Accordingly, intermediate scrutiny applies, and Hawaii must
show that the refusal to exempt guide dogs, but not other groups such
as circus animals and police and military dogs, substantially furthers
important state interests.
Hawaii's interest in preserving a rabies-free state constitutes an
important state interest. Yet, given the current state of veterinary
technology and the effectiveness of vaccinations, the application of the
quarantine may not substantially further that interest. Since the
quarantine unduly burdens a group approaching a quasi-suspect class,
other alternatives, such as a vaccination coupled with stringent
reporting and testing requirements, must be adopted.
Assuming, however, that the quarantine represents a viable
method for Hawaii to achieve its interests, Hawaii's refusal to exempt
guide dogs is based on archaic and inaccurate stereotypes that are not
indicative of the group's abilities. As stated previously, the quaran-
tine regulations presume that persons with disabilities cannot handle
their guide dogs without the help of a responsible sighted person. 8
In contrast, circus animals and military dogs may leave the premises
if accompanied by an authorized handler. 9 Thus, the current
quarantine law exemptions imply that persons with a disability are
incompetent.
Given that the quarantine and its exemptions burden a quasi-
suspect class, impair various important interests, and stem from
inaccurate stereotypes, Hawaii will have considerable difficulty
proving that the quarantine substantially furthers an important state
interest.
4. The rational basis test
If persons with disabilities do not qualify as a quasi-suspect class
warranting intermediate scrutiny, the quarantine law will be reviewed
according to the rational basis test. Traditionally, courts apply the
rational basis test with classifications used in economic and social
welfare legislation. Courts will uphold challenged legislation unless
the classification at issue does not bear a rational relationship to a
348. DOA RULES, supra note 17, § 4-18-12(f) (1981).
349. Id. § 4-18-10(b)(1)-(2).
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legitimate state interest."' Under this test the Court usually defers
to legislative judgment."1
a. the rational basis test "with teeth"
In the past few years, the Supreme Court has expanded equal
protection by applying a heightened review under the guise of "mere
rationality.""3 2  The Supreme Court has regarded illegitimate
children and the mentally retarded as potential candidates for judicial
strict scrutiny." In these contexts the Court applied heightened
scrutiny, yet it did not treat the classifications as suspect?' In both
situations the Court applied the mere rationality test more rigorously.
One commentator described this expansion of the equal protection
clause as "an effort to 'reach perceived injustices that otherwise lie
beyond constitutional reach.' ,
355
Assuming that Hawaii's quarantine law does not warrant strict
judicial scrutiny because persons with disabilities do not constitute a
suspect class, the quarantine law does not impair a guide dog user's
right to travel, or because persons with disabilities do not approach
a quasi-suspect status, the quarantine law may encounter another level
of scrutiny-the rational basis test with teeth.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,356 the Court
considered an equal protection challenge to a zoning ordinance that
denied a special use permit for the establishment of group homes for
the mentally retarded in an area zoned for multiple dwellings. The
Court of Appeals applied the intermediate scrutiny test because it
determined that the mentally retarded constituted a quasi-suspect
350. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221,230 (1981); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315 (mandatory
retirement for state police at age 50 held rationally related to the state's legitimate interest
of protecting public by having physically fit police).
351. Gayle L. Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any
Other Name, 62 IND. LJ. 779, 779 (1986).
352. See generally GUNTHER, supra note 264, at 620-22.
353. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding New York statute which
prevented illegitimate children from inheriting by intestate succession from their fathers
unless court made finding of paternity during father's lifetime); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968) (striking down a legitimacy-based classification that refused to allow unacknowl-
edged illegitimate children to bring wrongful death action for mother's death).
354. See Lalli, 493 U.S. at 265; Levy, 391 U.S. at 71.
355. Pettinga, supra note 351, at 779 (quoting David 0. Stewart, A Growing Equal
Protection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at 108, 112-14).
356. 473 U.S. 432, 435-37 (1985).
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class,3' and found that the ordinance did not promote any impor-
tant "governmental interest, thus, failing to satisfy intermediate
scrutiny.35
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the mentally
retarded were not a quasi-suspect class and thus deemed rational basis
as the appropriate standard.35 9 Based on a rational basis analysis,
the Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance because it found that
the city's refusal to grant a special use permit was not even "rationally
related" to any legitimate state purpose."W The Court held that the
city's decision unfairly singled out the retarded and, therefore, must
have been based on an irrational prejudice against the mentally
retarded. Thus, the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied.36'
Nevertheless, it seems apparent that the Court applied a more
exacting form of the rational basis test. It seems that prejudice
against the mentally retarded motivated the Court to apply a higher
standard. The Court stated that "there have been and there will
continue to be instances of discrimination against the retarded that
are in fact invidious ... 362
The dissent in Cleburne further bolstered the notion that the
Court applied a more rigorous rational basis test. Justice Marshall
stated that the "ordinance surely would be valid under the traditional
rational-basis test., 363 Under this test, courts generally presume that
the legislation is constitutional. 4 Thus, if the Court had applied
the traditional test, the City would not have faced the burden of
showing that the home would be overcrowded and the Court would
not have reviewed the legislature's explanations so vigorously.65
Finally, the Cleburne majority did not regard the mentally
retarded as a quasi-suspect class, as they contended that the
legislature's response to their problem had addressed any existing
prejudice.36 The dissent rebutted this notion in its statement that
"race-based classifications [did not become] any less suspect once
357. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 196-200 (5th Cir.),
aff'd, 473 U.S. 432 (1984).
358. Id. at 200-02.
359. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
360. Id. at 450.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 459 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 443.
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extensive legislation had been enacted on the subject." '67 Ongoing
discrimination against the mentally retarded, and arguably any other
group with such immutable characteristics, will persist throughout
society despite any legislative response. Nonetheless, the mentally
retarded prevailed despite the Court's failure to categorize that group
as a quasi-suspect class. Rather than strike down the entire ordi-
nance, the Court held that the ordinance, as applied to the particular
group home, violated equal protection2 61
Similarly, a court applying the rational basis with teeth test to
Hawaii's quarantine law would find that the law and its exemptions,
as applied to persons with disabilities traveling with guide dogs,
violate equal protection. Hawaii's blatant refusal to acknowledge that
guide dogs are not ordinary pets and pose a very low risk of spreading
rabies suggests a manifest prejudice. Furthermore, the Task Force's
proposed exemption and stringent requirements36 9 would certainly
accomplish Hawaii's stated purpose. Hawaii's exemption of circus
animals, celebrities' animals, and military dogs, and their refusal to
grant a guide dog exemption, bespeaks the irrationality of the statute.
If the Court applied a more exacting standard under the guise of
rational basis, as in Cleburne, it would find that an irrational prejudice
against persons with disabilities inspired the classification and, thus,
is not rationally related to a governmental interest. As applied to
persons with disabilities using guide dogs, the quarantine law would
be unconstitutional.
b. ordinary rational basis
When mere rationality is the test, a "classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against [the equal protection] clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality.""37 However, in spite of high
deference and presumptive constitutionality accorded in a mere
rationality review, both Hawaii's quarantine and its current exemp-
tions will not survive this test because it is both overinclusive and
irrational. Since Hawaii's state interest involves the exercise of police
power and public health concerns, it will most likely receive wide lati-
367. Id. at 467 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 450.
369. See supra part IV.
370. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
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tude.371 Nevertheless, even though rational basis may be highly
deferential, it is not toothless.3 ' Although the current quarantine
law may further the preservation of a rabies-free state in a rational
manner, the state has not chosen the best means to accomplish this
purpose. Given the overwhelming progress of medical technology, the
effectiveness of vaccinations, and the minuscule risk that guide dogs
pose to the spread of rabies, Hawaii's reliance on a law adopted over
eighty years ago is arbitrary and irrational.
Furthermore, Hawaii's quarantine law and its exemptions are
overinclusive because they "impose[] a burden upon a wider range of
individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with the
mischief at which the law aims."'373 Although the quarantine aims
to prevent the spread of rabies among animals known to be a
threat,374 quarantine officials indiscriminately apply the law to all
types of animals, regardless of the health and medical history of the
particular animal.375 Thus, Hawaii's quarantine law includes those
animals that pose no threat.
Hawaii may argue that its law does not indiscriminately apply to
all animals because it has exempted various groups. However,
Hawaii's current exemptions to its quarantine law merely confirm the
statute's irrationality and arbitrariness. "Rational" requires "that an
impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would
serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the
371. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303 (1976) ("States are accorded
latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational
distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.").
372. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,184 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 440 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (finding state employment discrimination statute that allowed
for the dismissal of a claim when employment commission inadvertently scheduled a fact-
finding conference after statutory period expired was not rational way of achieving
objective of expediting disputes); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
538 (1973) (holding federal food stamp limitation that distinguished between "households"
without any unrelated persons and those with unrelated persons was not rationally related
to the expressed purposes of the statute).
373. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341,351
(1949).
374. HAw. RaV. STAT. § 142-2 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
375. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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members of [a] ... disadvantaged class."376  Thus, the analysis
should at least include elements of legitimacy and neutrality.' 7
Hawaii's refusal to exempt guide dogs harms persons with
disabilities both physically and financially."' A quarantined guide
dog may lose its effectiveness, jeopardizing its owner's safety.379
Additionally, if the guide dog loses its skills during the quarantine, its
owner faces the serious financial burden of retraining.3 0 Consider-
ing the undue burden the quarantine imposes on the guide dog user,
it will be difficult to conclude that the quarantine, as a means to
prevent rabies, transcends harm to the members of this disadvantaged
class.
In addition, by refusing to grant a guide dog exemption, Hawaii
has created an arbitrary classification between guide dogs, which are
not exempt, and those animals which are exempt. The exemption
Hawaii granted to a celebrity best demonstrates the irrationality of
the quarantine's exceptions.81 In striking contrast, Hawaii refuses
to exempt guide dogs despite the minimal risk of rabies and their
unique, indispensable relationship to their owners' safety and ability
to function independently. Hawaii's blanket refusal to exempt the
small group of highly regulated guide dogs shows the statute's irratio-
nality.
Hawaii's current quarantine law and its concomitant exemptions
will have great difficulty satisfying all three standards of review under
the Equal Protection Clause. By adopting the Task Force's proposed
exemption, Hawaii could pass all levels of review. Since the proposal
imposes stringent reporting and testing requirements upon the guide
dog owner, it would not compromise the public health of Hawaii and,
thus, would foster Hawaii's compelling state interest. Simultaneously
it would accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities without
violating equal protection or any fundamental right. Hawaii's
quarantine not only implicates the Equal Protection Clause, but it also
implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
376. City of Richmond v. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 514 n.6 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
377. 1&
378. See supra part V.
379. See supra part V.
380. See supra part V.
381. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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D. Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from depriving individuals of "life, liberty or property,
without due process of law."3" Privacy rights protected as a sub-
stantive liberty interest under the Due Process Clause include the
right of personal security,313 personal autonomy, and bodily integri-
ty.384
Determining violations of due process and equal protection
involves identical constitutional analyses. Strict scrutiny, as well as
the rational basis test, places the same constitutional requirements on
the regulation regardless of which clause applies. As previously dis-
cussed, the Hawaii quarantine law does not pass constitutional muster
under Equal Protection nor under the Due Process Clause. The law
implicates the Due Process Clause and should be found unconstitu-
tional regardless of the standard of review applied.
1. Violations of the fundamental rights of
personal autonomy and security
Freedom of movement and personal autonomy are fundamental
rights at the core of the substantive liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause.3 The Court has traditionally applied strict
scrutiny to determine if legislation that impinges on these rights is a
constitutional invasion into a "zone of privacy." The Constitution
guarantees a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
386enter.
Hawaii's quarantine law affects the very interests protected by
substantive due process. Guide dogs are essential in allowing
individuals with disabilities to function independently in society to
participate in major life activities. Denying a visually-impaired person
the use of a guide dog imposes a severe limitation on the individual's
382. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
383. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
384. Id. at 673-74.
385. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990) ("[That
a] competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions."); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673
("Among the historic liberties so protected was a right to be free from, and to obtain
judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security."); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
164 (1973) (finding statute prohibiting abortion violates individuals right to privacy).
386. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2805 (1992).
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ability to move freely and safely. Strict scrutiny applies in this
situation because the regulation considerably limits an individual's
liberty to move freely in a safe manner,3 to effectively comprehend
the surroundings, and to use an accepted and legal treatment for the
disability.
Visually-impaired individuals have available alternatives
regarding the methods of assistance they choose. The existence of
these alternatives enables Hawaii to argue that the state is only
temporarily restricting the use of a particular means, not depriving the
visually impaired of constitutional interests; the quarantine does not
affect a visually-impaired person who has chosen to use a cane instead
of a guide dog. However, the individual made the decision to use a
guide dog rather than a cane long before and independent of the
decision to visit Hawaii, and because of the safety issues, returning to
cane usage is not a viable alternative.
The inadequacy of the available alternatives indicates that the
choice is in effect involuntary. This assertion is analogous to the
following: To determine whether individuals at mental institutions
suffered a restriction or loss of due process rights, courts viewed their
voluntary admission to the facility as "an illusory concept. Few if any
residents now have, nor did they have at the time of admission, any
adequate alternative to their institutionalization.""
Similarly, the visually impaired have very little choice in how
they choose to maintain their personal autonomy and safety. The
primary alternative to a guide dog is a cane. However, once this
choice is made, the visually-impaired person has committed to the use
of one method over the other and use of a cane in most cases does
not present a practical alternative.389
Hawaii's goal to prevent the spread of rabies is a compelling
state interest; however, other less restrictive means exist. Given the
state's inconsistent practices in granting exemptions, a court should
387. Although incarceration implicates the same rights, prisoners are afforded less than
strict scrutiny, because applying strict scrutiny to prison or institution regulations places
an undue burden on the administrators. Special expertise required to manage such
facilities entitles the rulemaking authority to greater deference. No such special
circumstances can justify the application of a standard of review lower than strict scrutiny
for the quarantine law. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982).
388. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 485 (D. N.D.
1982) (quoting Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,1311 (E.D.
Pa. 1977)).
389. See supra part VI.
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find that the law violates due process regardless of the standard of
review applied.
IX. CONCLUSION
Hawaii's quarantine law violates the rights of persons with
disabilities. It assumes that visually-impaired persons cannot control
their guide dogs. The federal statutes and the United States
Constitution protect persons with disabilities from discrimination and,
therefore, the Hawaii quarantine law must be overturned. Hawaii's
own Task Force has recommended that the laws be amended and,
only upon such. an amendment, will the rights of persons with
disabilities be protected.
